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I. INTRODUCTION
A. ARMS CONTROL PERSPECTIVES
On September 18, 1987 President Reagan announced that the United States and
the Soviet Union had reached an agreement in principle on the reduction of
intermediate-range missiles in Europe. The specific details of the agreement were not
announced, nor were any verification procedures. However, it appears that a formal
INF agreement will be forthcoming.
The purpose of this study is to identify and analyze the political and military
factors which have motivated the Soviet Union to pursue an INF arms control treaty
with the United States. While the arms control process between the United States and
the Soviet Union has been ongoing for decades. This thesis focuses on the issue of
intermediate-range missiles during the period from 1979 to 1987. This thesis will
explore the hypothesis that Soviet agreement to an INF" treaty is not a ellort to reduce
tensions and the likelihood of war in Europe, but is a calculated part of its strategy to
decouple the United States from NATO, and to weaken the military capability of the
Atlantic alliance.
Modern arms control concepts emerged during the late 1950s with the
development of the ICBM and the increase of concern about surprise attack.
American theorists assumed that each side held a common interest in stable nuclear
arms relationships that would reduce the risks of war by surprise or accident.
Americans believed that arms control would help ease the threat of surprise attack or
preemptive attack by promoting more survivable deterrent forces on both sides. Arms
control further would reduce the likelihood of war by reducing incentives for an arms
race. Arms control was conceived as a process that could increase stability in the
world.
This concept of arms control was based on the notion that there would be areas
of" overriding mutual interest in improving the survivability of nuclear arsenals
and reducing the risks of war. This, in fact, remained the central article of faith
in arms control. There would be arms cooperation between the superpowers
despite their political deferences. Arms control itself would be apolitical.
[Ref. 1: p. 5]
Despite wide differences as to the objectives and potential contributions of arms
control, it has become a part of both the United States and the Soviet Union's security
policy. Support for arms control is not universal and the objectives of arms control
differ between the United states and the Soviet Union.
The basic American assumptions about arms control are: it would enhance
security through cooperation, it is based on common security needs, and it is based on
common interests concerning world stability. Arms control would reduce the threat of
war. reduce the cost of preparing for war, and reduce damage in the event of war.
The Soviet theory of stability is not the same as that of the United States. The
Soviet goal in arms control has been to achieve a better correlation of forces for the
Soviet Union, not to achieve stability or parity with the United States.
Generally, the U.S.S.R.'s arms control policy has been to avoid limitations that
restrict its arms plans and programs. [Ref. I: p. 11]
Politics can not be divorced from arms control. Soviet political and military
objectives have historically been served by the Soviet arms control policies. This thesis
explores the idea that the goal of the Soviet arms control effort in the INF
negotiations and in the political campaign against NATO nuclear force modernization
has been to support Soviet political-military doctrine and strategy vis a vis the NATO
alliance. Soviet correlation of forces versus NATO was threatened by NATO's decision
to modernize its theater nuclear forces. This decision became known as the "double
track decision".
B. NATO'S DOUBLE TRACK DECISION
On 12 December 1979, after considerable research and debate, NATO
promulgated its "double track decision": to deploy U.S. Pershing II and Ground
Launched Cruise Missiles, in selected West European countries if the United States
were unable to negotiate the elimination of Soviet SS-20 nuclear missiles prior to the
end of 1983. The decision to deploy intermediate range nuclear forces in Europe was
rooted in concerns over the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence guarantees and the
desire to minimize the risk of war or intimidation. Shifts in the military balance and
changing perceptions of the Soviet threat contributed to worries within the alliance.
Shifts in the military balance resulted primarily from the general and continuing
modernization of Soviet forces, which led to increases in and improvements of LRINF
weapons. The modernization of Soviet air defenses, the deployment of the SS- 20, and
perceived parity of strategic forces, 1 caused great concern within the alliance.
In regards to strategic nuclear forces, the Soviet Union had by 1972 acquired
strategic parity with the United States, an event acknowledged by the SALT
agreement. Moreover, subsequent increases in the number and accuracy of Soviet
reentry vehicles began to put at risk essential components of U.S. strategic nuclear
forces, especially the ICBMs on which the U.S. relied for prompt, controlled and
limited counterforce strikes at Soviet targets, should this prove necessary.
In theater nuclear forces, the Soviets not only modernized short range ballistic
missiles such as the Scud and Scaleboard, but also developed nuclear capable artillery
and improved the range and carrying capacity of tactical aircraft. The most significant
improvements, in NATO's eyes, were the production of a new medium bomber, the
Backfire, and a new mobile intermediate range ballistic missile, the SS-20, with three
independently targetable reentry vehicles which were more accurate than those of its
predecessors. The Soviets argued that this new missile was simply a replacement for
the outmoded SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. However, as there was little indication that the
Soviets were phasing out the old SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, the suspicions oi~ members of
the Western alliance were aroused. [Ref. 2: pp.3S-39]
The add ons, in 1979, were not significant enough in total numbers of nuclear
weapons to alter substantially the nuclear military balance (see Appendix A). However,
the mobility o[ the SS-20 made it more difficult to locate and destroy, while its highly
accurate and lower yield nuclear warheads made it more suitable for counterforce
strikes against NATO military targets. Therefore NATO's longer range theater nuclear
forces became more vulnerable to Soviet strikes. All in all, the combination of larger
and better Soviet forces and increasingly vulnerable NATO forces could mean that the
Soviet Union would have escalation dominance, the ability to control the level of a
nuclear exchange by deterring NATO from using its tactical nuclear forces, thereby
rending the "seamless web of deterrence" [Ref. 2: p. 31]. The Soviets maintained that
they were just seeking to maintain the theater nuclear balance not trying to upset it in
their favor.
SALT neutralized U.S. and Soviet nuclear capabilities at the strategic level.
Europeans were concerned that since the U.S. no longer had a strategic advantage
over the Soviet Union, the U.S. would be less likely to honor its commitment to
'Parity is the condition in which two nation's nuclear forces are roughly
equivalent in effectiveness and capabilities.
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launch nuclear weapons in the defense of Western Europe. Moreover, the SALT
balance magnified the significance of disparities between East and West in tactical
nuclear weapons as well as in conventional force levels. The U.S. failure to achieve
substantial limits on the Backfire bomber (during SALT II negotiations) and especially
the easy U.S. acceptance of the Soviet claim that the Backfire did not have a strategic
mission but only a theater role, disturbed members of NATO. This along with the
failure to limit deployments of the SS-20, and the Carter administration's "neutron
bomb" fiasco, led many NATO officials to believe that the U.S. was only looking after
its own interests, rather than the interests of the alliance.
In May 1977 NATO officials decided to review NATO'S nuclear forces. The
NATO Nuclear Planning Group delegated the review responsibility to the High Level
Group consisting of officials from eleven NATO countries, with U.S. Assistant
Secretary of Defense David McGiffert as the chairman. The High Level Group was
charged with examining the role of theater nuclear weapons in NATO strategy, the
implications of recent Soviet theater nuclear force deployments, the need for NATO
theater force modernization, and the technical, military, and political implications of
alternative force postures. [Ref. 2: p. 16]
By February 1978 there existed within the High Level Group a broad consensus
that a new NATO nuclear weapons deployment was needed, and at a meeting in April
1979. the NATO Nuclear Planning Group decided to deploy between 200 and 600
weapons. The High Level Group was given the task to determine the final details as to
numbers, types, and deployment areas. Four alternatives were contemplated: 1
)
Pershing II Missiles, 2) Ground Launched Cruise Missiles, 3) Sea Launched Cruise
Missiles, and 4) a new mobile medium range missile. The High Level Group proposed
the deployment of 108 Pershing II missiles and 464 Ground Launched Cruise Missiles.
The new medium range mobile missile was dropped from consideration because it had
not yet been developed, in contrast to the availability of the Pershing II and Ground
Launched Cruise Missile. GLCMs were chosen over SLCMs because the GLCMs
would be more visible than the SLCMs thereby visibly coupling the U.S. nuclear force
to Europe. Although SLCMs had the military advantage of flexible deployment, and
high survivability, the political consideration for GLCMs won out. [Ref. 2: p. 1 7]
The High Level Group also proposed, at West Germany's insistence, that at least
one other continental European country would base the new forces on its soil, so that
it would not appear that West Germany was the only non-nuclear country demanding
and receiving the new nuclear weapons. Moreover, the weapons would remain under
U.S. control. With the weapons remaining under U.S. control, the NATO
governments would not have to purchase the weapons; and it also assured the Soviet
Union that the Federal Republic of Germany was not in control of nuclear weapons
that could strike Soviet territory. [Ref. 2: p. 18]
The High Level Group decided on the number of 572 weapons for both military
and political reasons. The military wanted sufficient weapons to survive a preemptive
attack, as well as the ability to penetrate Soviet air defenses. The political reasoning
for 572 was to have enough weapons for adequate dispersal throughout several
countries, a force large enough to be a deterrent, and a force large enough to absorb
force reductions from arms control negotiations. It was felt that land based systems
would best demonstrate to the Soviet Union as well as the people of Western Europe,
the American nuclear commitment to Western Europe in the most tangible manner.
[Ref. 2: p. 19]
Final deployment distribution of the new forces was 108 Pershing II missiles and
96 GLCMs in West Germany, 160 GLCMs in Great Britain, 112 GLCMs in Italy, and
4S GLCMs in Belgium and Holland respectively. [Ref. 3: p. 13]
C. THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE
In the 1950s the Soviet Union gave priority to the deployment of medium range
systems that could strike targets around the Soviet periphery, particularly in and
around Europe. This decision appears to have been conditioned by three main
considerations. The first was technological. Their intercontinental bombers suffered
from serious deficiencies: the Bison did not have enough range for two-way
intercontinental missions, while the Bear had a lower speed and ceiling, making it more
vulnerable to air defenses. With no bases close to the United States, the MRBM was
the weapon of choice as it did not require inflight refueling and could not be brought
down by air defenses. [Ref. 4: p. 5]
The second consideration was that many of the American nuclear forces that
could threaten the Soviet Union were based close to Soviet borders, in and around
Europe. These bases could also be replenished with other forces in the event of war.
The most important targets for the Soviets in war were those time urgent nuclear
forces in Europe which the Soviets considered strategic forces since they could strike
Soviet territory.
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The third consideration was that the threat of nuclear destruction of Western
Europe would act as a deterrent against an attack by the U.S. on the Soviet Union.
The aim of deterring an American attack by threatening Western Europe with
destruction complemented rather than contradicted the interest in preparing to wage a
nuclear war. Soviet military thought did not then, and does not now, draw a sharp
distinction between weapons for deterrence and weapons for war fighting. Deterrence
for the Soviets is achieved by maintaining military forces that would enable them to
fight and win a war, not just to deter a war. The deterring effect of weapons is not seen
as something separate from their utility in fighting a war. These medium range systems
were designed to destroy NATO military targets in the event of war.
Soviet deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces ceased in the mid-1960s
and did not begin again until the mid- 1970s. Several things had changed since their
initial deployment. The SS-4 and SS-5 missiles were vulnerable to a first strike attack
as most were not housed in underground silos. Although Soviet doctrine gave
significant importance to striking first in the event of war. the Soviets also began to
become concerned about the survivability of their forces to a U.S. preemptive strike.
The operational characteristics of the SS-4 and SS-5 did not mesh well with the
growing changes in Soviet doctrine. The Soviets were beginning to believe that
conventional war in Europe could precede a nuclear exchange. The slow launch
preparation time of the SS-4 and SS-5 was a serious problem, given their penchant for
preemption. Also if conventional warfare did develop, the war could go nuclear at any
time, especially with NATO's declaratory policy of first use, so flexible weapons were
needed that could be fired quickly. These problems led to the production of the
Backfire bomber which entered service in 1974, and the SS-20 IRBM which became
operational in 1977. [Ref. 5: pp.99- 105]
The SS-20 was a significant improvement over the SS-4 and SS-5. It is a solid
fuel mobile missile, derived from the SS-16 ICBM. The SS-20 has three MIRV
warheads and is more accurate than the SS-4 and SS-5, and takes only minutes to
make ready for launching. The SS-20 also has a greater range than either the SS-4 or
SS-5. [Ref. 6: p. 45] The deployment o[ the SS-20 played an important role in the
NATO "double track decision'' of 12 December 1979. The European view was that the
SS-20 upgraded the Soviet capabilities and moreover was a clear indication of the
Soviet desire for military superiority. The Soviets have vociferously denied that their
goal is military superiority and have asserted that the SS- 20 deployment was only a
modernization of obsolete forces that did not alter the balance of forces. [Ref. 7: p. 42]
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D. THE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE
The American support of the 1979 'double track decision' was based on the need
to respond to European political concerns about the credibility of the American
nuclear guarantee, especially after the neutron bomb affair. Supporting this decision by
modernizing forces would have the important military purpose of increasing the
potential costs to the Soviet Union of aggression in Europe by putting at risk targets in
the Soviet Union and introducing more flexibility and survivability in NATO's force
posture. Ronald Reagan voiced his support of the "double track decision" during his
speech to the National Press Club on 23 November 19S1:
To counter this (SS-20) the allies agreed in 1979, as part of a two-track decision,
to deploy as a deterrent land-based cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles
capable of reaching targets in the Soviet Union. These missiles are to be
deployed in several countries of Western Europe. This relatively limited force in
no way serves as a substitute for the much larger strategic umbrella spread over
our NATO allies. Rather, it provides a vital link between conventional, shorter-
range nuclear forces in Europe and intercontinental forces in the United States.
Deployment of these systems will demonstrate to the Soviet Union that this link
can not be broken. [Ref. 8: p. 187]
Reagan's "zero option' proposal in regards to the INF situation is his method
of earning out the negotiation part of the NATO "double track decision". The recent
negative comments from NATO officials concerning the "zero option" proposalmay
indicate that many NATO Europeans do not really want an INF arms control
agreement." Many critics claim that the 'zero option' proposal does not support or
follow along with the NATO position of 12 December 1979. However, Lord Peter
Carrington, NATO Secretary General, supports Reagan's view:
The Zero-Option on medium-range missiles was something which was implicitly
accepted by the Europeans when they agreed to the double-track decision,
because the double track decision said if the Soviet Union withdraws their
SS-20's, we will not deploy the cruise and Pershing missiles. IRef. 9: p.l4|
"For example: Helmut Kohl expressed his concern about the arms reductions
discussed at Reykjavik:
...if all nuclear arms are cut the NATO military strategy of flexible response
would be put at risk. ...Conventional stability in Europe must be given greater
attention in the future, especially if there are drastic reductions in nuclear
weapons. Insight, S December 19S6, p. 16
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Americans and Europeans also differ in their respective views of the role of tactical
nuclear weapons in the doctrine of flexible response. The NATO flexible response
doctrine was developed in 1967. Its declaratory policy is that any Soviet and or
Warsaw pact attack will be met by adequate means, and if conventional defense did
not suffice, nuclear weapons would be employed.
The strategy set out in NIC 14 3 seeks to deter aggression by the maintenance of
conventional, theater nuclear and strategic nuclear forces that would enable the
Alliance to respond to any attack at any appropriate level. The initial response
would be direct defense, seeking to defeat the aggression on the level at which the
enemy has chosen to fight. If the aggression could not be contained, the Alliance
would be prepared to conduct a deliberate escalation, raising but where possible
controlling the scope and intensity of combat, with the aim of making the cost
and risk disproportionate to the aggressor's objectives and the threat of nuclear
war more imminent. [Ref. 10: p. 9]
An application of the flexible response strategy could entail the use of tactical
nuclear weapons on Allied territory in an attempt to end the conflict by convincing the
Soviets of the will of the Allies to resist. Many European officials and experts would
prefer to use Pershing II and GLCMs, which have sufficient range to reach Soviet
territory, instead of tactical nuclear weapons, to couple the U.S. strategic deterrent to
the defense of Europe. The Americans, meanwhile, would prefer to use tactical nuclear
weapons to prevent a land battle from escalating into an all-out strategic exchange.
[Ref. 10: p.lOJ
The Europeans are more concerned with ensuring the deterrent effect of the
nuclear weapons than with their war fighting capability. In their view, Pershing lis
and GLCMs offer more deterrent than tactical battlefield nuclear weapons, due to their
ability to hold Soviet territory at risk. An INF agreement that would call for the
removal of intermediate-range nuclear missiles would lessen the deterrent to a Soviet
attack. General Wolfgang Altenburg. chairman of NATO's military committee
expressed the following view of nuclear deterrence:
...all of us agree that the threat of MAD (mutual assured destruction), is an
abysmal way to implement our peacetime strategy of deterrence. Nonetheless,
for the time being it works, and we would be prudent not to tamper with it until
something better comes along. ...Nuclear weapons are in fact useful only as a
deterrent. [Ref. 11: p. 9]
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The existence of American tactical nuclear weapons in Europe raises the risk,
for the Soviet Union, that a conventional regional conflict might escalate into a major
nuclear war. These nuclear forces reduce the risk, for the United States, that an
overwhelming conventional attack by the East against Western Europe would leave no
other choice than that of acceptance of a fait accompli or nuclear strategic retaliation
against the Soviet Union. These forward based systems may allow the U.S. to confine
the war to the European continent, by exercising limited nuclear options with these
forces while holding U.S. based strategic forces in reserve. The Soviets have attempted
to counter the limited nuclear option policy by declaring that any nuclear attack
against Soviet territory launched from Europe, would be treated just as if the weapons
were launched from the U.S., and the Soviet Union would respond with nuclear attacks
against U.S. territory.
If the United States were to agree in a treaty to nuclear inferiority (many believe
this happened with SALT), this could raise serious questions in the minds of Soviet
leaders as well as many Europeans about the American commitment to provide U.S.
nuclear forces in both SALT negotiations, and have also nuclear weapons for the
defense of Europe. The political imperative for the U.S. is to ensure equal ceilings in
any arms control agreement. This has been the declared policy of the Reagan
administration, reductions to equal ceilings, and has resulted in criticism that his
approach has been too staunch, thereby preventing any arms control agreements with
the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union attempted to include forward based U.S. nuclear forces in
both SALT negotiations, and have also wanted to include British and French forces in
both START and INF negotiations.
These forward-based systems were indispensable elements of the security of
America's allies and it was a bad omen for the talks that this matter had been
raised. But there FBS was and there it remained through hundreds of hours of
argumentation. [Ref. 12: p.9 1 ]
The American position has been that forward based systems are not strategic weapons
but are only for use in theater operations. All U.S. administrations have rejected the
Soviet proposal of including British and French nuclear systems in any negotiations.
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The U.S. position is that the British and French forces are third country forces and are
not, therefore, germane to U.S. - Soviet negotiations. The forces are the strategic
deterrent for protection of the British and French homelands. They are independent
and are not under U.S. control, and do not provide any other countries a deterrent
against the Soviet threat.
The Reagan administration continues to seek an INF agreement narrowly
focused on land based missiles, refusing to include nuclear capable aircraft in any
missile deal, arguing that limits on aircraft could undermine the effectiveness of
NATO's conventional forces.
E. SUMMARY
Soviet theater force modernization in the 1970s resulted in NATO's decision to
respond with new INF missiles, if the Soviets did not remove the SS-20 missiles. The
Soviets maintained that the deployment of the SS-20 did not alter the military balance
in their favor.
Chapter Two discusses Soviet military and political strategy versus NATO and
the relationship of the SS-20 missile to Soviet military doctrine.
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II. SOVIET STRATEGY TOWARDS EUROPE
A. SOVIET POLITICAL OBJECTIVES IN EUROPE
Western Europe has been regarded by the Soviet Union as the most important
region in the global competition between socialism and capitalism. It is viewed as a
potential prize due to its highly developed economic infrastructure and vast industrial
base. Despite some friction, the European Economic Community has grown into a
world economic power.
In 1980 the European Community's share of the world's gross national product
stood at 22.6% against 22.1% for the United States and 11.5% for the Soviet
Union, and the combined population o[ its member states equaled that of the
U.S.S.R. and surpassed that of the U.S. [Ref. 13: p.28]
The successes of the EEC and Western Europe as a whole have repercussions in
the various countries of Eastern Europe, and therefore pose problems for the Soviet
Union's control of its satellites. Beyond Western Europe's economic and cultural
success, it is the military bridgehead of the United States on the European continent.
If the Soviets were able to deny the U.S. access to this bridgehead, the global power
position of the U.S. would be decisively weakened. It has been the objective of the
Soviet Union since 1949 to decouple the U.S. from Western Europe and to destroy
NATO:
A clear, steady, and pervasive objective of Soviet policy ever since the inception
of the Atlantic Alliance has been to split the political foundations of Alliance
solidarity and dampen the defense efforts of the individual members.
[Ref. 14:' p. 9]
The Soviet Union has sought to retain control of Eastern Europe, while
increasing its influence in Western Europe. It has attempted to conduct a bilateral
dialogue with the United States and rival ones with the West European states,
particularly France and West Germany. Moscow has combined growing military power
with an arms control dialogue and economic cooperation conducted under the guise of
detente.
The Soviet force build-up became obvious in the late 1960s. First, it was clear
that the Soviets had decided to go global militarily by building up the Soviet na\y, and
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other conventional forces, as well as the Warsaw pact forces. Second, the Soviets
decided after the failure of the halfhearted attempts at domestic economic reform in
1965, to assign foreign trade and technological inputs from the West a more central
role in the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. These decisions were implemented through
cooperation with the West and making detente irreversible, and helping the "world
revolutionary process" along. [Ref. 15: p. 40]
That is. it has endeavored to detach Western Europe from the United States and
align it with the Soviet bloc, at least to the degree of rendering its ties with the
United States more precarious and marginal and its ties with the Soviet Union
more central and irreversible. [Ref. 15: p. 47]
The Soviet Union has downplayed its massive build-up of military forces as
necessary to ensure the defense of the U.S.S.R.. The Soviet Union's position has been
that its military forces are for defensive purposes and have no offensive role, while the
military forces of the Western powers are offensive weapons poised to be used in an
invasion of the Soviet Union. However, Soviet actions and reactions must always be
seen as both offensive and defensive:
Like the Soviet tradition itself (whether through its Russian or Marxist side),
they blur the distinction between offensive and defensive, by involving a search
for security which is by its very nature expansionist, a feeling of weakness which
by its very nature leads to a demonstration of strength, a stress on maintaining
the control of the empire which by its very nature encourages an attempt to
establish preventive control over the external environment. [Ref. 15: p. 39]
The Soviet Union has attempted to develop a policy of "peaceful coexistencea-3
with the West:
"peaceful coexistence" is the absence of war but not relaxation of the ideological
struggle between capitalism and communism.
To realise the policy of P.C., it is very important to enhance mutually beneficial
economic, scientific and cultural ties between states with different social systems
in every possible way. The benefit gained by individual capitalist countries from
such ties cannot, of course, prevent or noticeably slow down the general decay of
the capitalist system resulting from the aggravation of inherent contradictions. As
the principle of P.C. wins growing recognition and the contacts between the two
social systems are enhanced, the role and importance of ideological struggle as an
indispensable component of the world revolutionary process increases. A
Dictionary of Scientific Communism, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 19S4. p. 172.
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Soviet peacetime policy clearly reflects an anticoalition strategy toward Western
Europe. The Soviets have sought to play on trends toward greater consideration
for national, rather than joint strategies among Western powers. [Ref. 16: p.21U]
The maximization of Soviet power requires the reduction of NATO's cohesion and the
pursuit by the Soviets of a strategy to drive wedges and expand fissures within the
alliance.
The preferred Soviet method of achieving such goals has been detente in
conditions of clear Soviet superiority. Without detente, Soviet superiority or
military pressure can encourage Atlantic unity or. if the West Europeans perceive
the Atlantic connection as unreliable or dangerous, drive the West Europeans
toward unity and an autonomous defense. Without Soviet superiority detente,
can promote instability in Eastern Europe by raising East European expectations
excessively and by increasing West European influence in the area. It is only the
two together which maximize Soviet interests. [Ref. 15: p. 47]
A major plank of Soviet detente policy has been arms control. Soviet arms
control policy combined with the spirit of detente attempts to lessen West European
fears of Soviet military capabilities. By participating in arms control discussions, the
Soviets create an image as a nation which wants to lessen the chance of war and one
that is working toward world stability. What is important for the Soviets is the
appearance of negotiating, not necessarily reaching an agreement or treaty. The
Soviets will, however, definitely sign an agreement which codifies their numerical
superiority (such as SALT I limits on the number of ICBMs and SLB.Ms) or which
creates a favorable balance of forces for the Soviet Union. Arms control, coupled with
detente, is part of the grand design of Soviet political expansionism. The Soviets
probably regard the INF negotiations as an instrument against NATO, an enterprise
which may result in creating military superiority for the Soviet Union.
B. SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE TOWARDS NATO
Military doctrine and military strategy are often considered as being one and the
same in the United States. However, the Soviets make a distinction between doctrine
and strategy. Military doctrine defines the nature of a future war, the probable
adversaries, Soviet objectives in such a war. general characteristics of the forces
required to achieve the objectives, and the policies for preparedness. Military doctrine
is developed by the Soviet politburo, and once it has been formulated it is not
debatable. [Ref. 17: pp.88-89]
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Military strategy is subordinate to military doctrine. Military strategy specifies
how the objectives developed by doctrine are to be achieved, what forces and weapons
are required, and the interrelationships between military requirements and economic
and technological capabilities. Military strategy can be and is often debated in the
Soviet Union. Military doctrine requires the Soviet Union to be prepared to fight and
win a war at all levels of combat, including nuclear war. [Ref. 17: p.79|
Soviet military doctrine and military strategy stems from Lenin and was first
practiced during the Civil War. Lenin's strategy of maneuver consisted of: finding the
weakest link, massing forces until the correlation of forces had become favorable, then
breaking through, encircling and annihilating the enemy. This strategy was used
repeatedly by the ground forces during the Great patriotic War. The backbone of this
doctrine was a unified command controlling combined arms forces, which is still in
vogue today.
An essential question for a military planner today is whether future wars are
likely to be conventional, nuclear, or a combination of both. This question has been
debated by both Soviet and Western policy makers since the creation of atomic
weapons. At the crux of the debate is the problem of defining the military utility of
nuclear weapons. Soviet doctrine has evolved since the revolution in military affairs
occurred in 1953.
From 1953 to 1964. Soviet doctrine held that if war occurred it would be an all
out intercontinental nuclear war. The war would entail massive use of nuclear weapons
from the start of the conflict. The 1962 edition of Soviet Military Strategy said:
The use of strategic missiles will have an especially great effect on the nature of
war as a whole. Their quantitative and qualitative development in the Soviet
Union has achieved such a level that it is now possible to destroy simultaneously
the necessary number of objectives of an aggressor in the most remote regions of
the earth and to put entire countries out of the war as a result of massed missile
attacks. [Ref. 18: p. 194]
This doctrine was declaratory (vice operational), and it was ennunciated so completely
that it helped create the so-called myth of the "missile gap" in the late 1950s. This
doctrine emphasized the importance of the Strategic Rocket Forces, formed by
Khrushchev in 1959, and reduced the importance of conventional forces especially the
Ground Forces. The second edition of Soviet Military Strategy (1963) said:
Thus, rockets are the most effective and most promising means of armed combat.
The massive use of nuclear rockets substantially alters the nature of war and the
methods of waging it and imparts to war an extremely decisive and destructive
character. [Ref. 18: p. 194)
The dismissal of Khrushchev led to a review and reappraisal of military doctrine.
The possibility of war starting with a conventional phase emerged along with the
possibility of a theater war being fought only along conventional lines. The U.S. shift
from "massive retaliation" to "flexible response" increased the likelihood of
conventional warfare, and resulted in a revaluation of Soviet doctrine.
Coming to grips with the military implications of Secretary of Defense
McNamara's concept of flexible response', a significant initial phase of
conventional warfare was recognized as possibly preceding the first nuclear
exchanges in theatre. The enemy might well initiate conflict at the conventional
level and. all else being equal, it could be to Soviet advantage not to resort
immediately to nuclear warfare. [Ref. 19: p. 22]
In 1967 U.S. forces reached the level planned by McXamara: 1,000 Minutemen
ICBMs, 54 Titan ICBMs, 41 SSBNs, and 500 B-52 bombers. This publicly announced
force structure established a benchmark of parity for Soviet strategic nuclear weapon
procurements. By the late 1960s, the Soviet Union was reaching parity with U.S.
nuclear forces. Parity decreased the likelihood of the United States initiating a nuclear
exchange, thereby creating a situation of mutual deterrence.
Soviet military theoreticians had apparently concluded that as a result of the
changing conditions brought about primarily by the Soviet achievement of
strategic parity, the exercise of restraint in the employment of nuclear weapons
by both sides was a distinct possibility. [Ref. 20: pp. 59-60]
In a 1968 Military Thought article, Marshall Sokolovskiy and Major-General
Cherednichenko discussed the problems of planning for modern war. The possible
scenarios included conventional war. limited theater nuclear war, as well as general
nuclear war.
By this time, Soviet military theoreticians had apparently concluded that in the
event of a future conflict, the possibility existed that the conduct of nuclear
warfare could be restricted to certain, unspecified geographic regions; these
regions could be as large as a theater of military action (IMA), which represents
the basic geographic unit in Soviet military planning. Moreover, limitations on
the extent of nuclear weapons employment within TMAs were also acknowledged
as a distinct possibility. [Ref. 20: p. 59]
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By the mid-1970s the Soviets believed that a central war in Europe would most
likely begin as conventional, and at some point in the conflict. NATO would be forced
to resort to nuclear weapons. The Soviets would preempt with operational and tactical
nuclear weapons. There was nothing in the Soviet literature that suggested that
NATO's use of nuclear weapons would cause a massive strategic nuclear strike by the
Soviets. The Soviet preemptive strike would entail surface to surface missiles, nuclear
artillery, and tactical aviation. The targets would be NATO's means of delivery of
nuclear weapons, as well as enemy force groupings, main operating bases, and
command and control centers. The Soviets would consider these strikes to be limited
nuclear strikes, even though they required a large number of nuclear weapons. The
strikes would be limited, in that they were limited to a specific geographic area.
[Ref. 20: p. 62]
The Soviets did not believe that limited nuclear war necessarily had to escalate to
general nuclear war. However, if the enemy did escalate the conflict to general war,
the Soviets were prepared to fight and do their best to win an all out nuclear war.
Parity in strategic nuclear forces was not the only reason why the Soviets would
not want immediate nuclear use in war. Some believed that a rough parity in
conventional forces would offer few incentives for either side to escalate to nuclear use.
Escalation might be more probable if there was a drastic imbalance in conventional
capabilities. Some believed that the destruction caused by nuclear weapons would be
unpredictable and could be disruptive to the combat operations of one's own forces in
the theater of military operations. Large scale theater nuclear use could have a
disruptive effect on Soviet troop control.
The massive preemption case aside, Soviet military planners may have concluded
that the uncertainties and complexities of operating in an unrestrained nuclear
environment offset the benefits of massive employment. Considerations of purely
military effectiveness would appear to underlie this conclusion. [Ref. 20: p. 70]
In the end. for all their studies and analyses (or perhaps, because of them), Soviet
military writers do not appear to demonstrate confidence that they know how to
manage a full scale theater nuclear war. [Ref. 19: p. 22]
This is not to suggest that they no longer have an interest in theater nuclear forces,
only that there are significant command and control advantages in conventional vice
nuclear war.
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The destructive power of nuclear weapons must be considered against the
political and military objectives:
An overriding desire to avoid massive damage to the Soviet homeland has
motivated Soviet decision makers not only to develop concepts for this mode of
warfare but also to invest in the development of a flexible, survivable, and
increasingly effective in-theater nuclear capability. [Ref. 20: p. 76]
If the overall Soviet objective in a war against NATO is to capture the European
industrial base intact while limiting and controlling collateral damage, the use of
nuclear weapons is of supreme importance. Turning Europe into a nuclear waste zone
would not aid the Soviet Union in post war reconstruction.
With the U.S. acknowledgement of parity at the level of strategic nuclear forces,
with the SALT I treaty, the Soviets concluded that a future war might no longer be
initiated by massive strikes on the homelands or on theater targets. A clear
opportunity now existed for the Soviets to postpone, and possibly altogether avoid,
U.S. strikes on the Soviet homeland. In order to achieve this objective, the Soviets
required a robust theater conventional and nuclear force structure while at the same
time developing survivable and effective intercontinental forces to deter, and if
necessary to defeat, the U.S. exercise of its strategic nuclear guarantee. By the
mid-1970s, Soviet military theoreticians had successfully developed an approach to the
conduct of limited nuclear warfare. The past twenty years of Soviet military
development have demonstrated their commitment to foot the bill for this force
procurement. [Ref. 20: p. 72]
U.S. declaratory doctrine was officially modified on 4 March 1974 with the
issuance of NSDM-242. Four factors influenced NSDM-242. First, there was a
growing U.S. anxiety about the strategic balance. Second, there was concern over the
increase in Soviet weapon programs and increases across the board in Soviet force
posture. Third, technological advances in weaponry created more flexible counterforce
options. Fourth, there was an increasingly unsympathetic attitude toward the "MAD"
approach articulated by some officials. NSDM-242 reportedly called for changes in
U.S. targeting policy and highlighted the concept of limited nuclear options' in theater
warfare.
This change in U.S. military doctrine brought forth vociferous Soviet criticism of
the possibility of limited nuclear warfare. The Soviets also were critical of the revised
strategy because they felt that it was an attempt to recover U.S. losses in SALT:
The Soviets believed that these U.S. developments were designed to defeat a
primary objective of the Soviet strategic buildup: that of decoupling U.S.
strategic forces from NATO. [Ref. 20: p. 73]
Soviet declaratory policy rejected the possibility of a limited nuclear war. and
attempted to discredit the new U.S. doctrine. Despite their declaratory policy against
the possibility of limiting nuclear war, the Soviets continued to build forces and
conduct training in the military art of combined arms warfare in a limited nuclear war.
The Soviet rejection of limited theater nuclear war became a key plank of their
propaganda campaign against the deployment of Pershing II and GLCMs by NATO. 4
C. SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY VERSUS NATO
Soviet military doctrine requires military planners to develop strategy to cover all
the contingencies in all conceivable types of war. Military objectives are subordinate
to political objectives. The objectives in a war against NATO would be: to capture
the industrial base while causing as little collateral damage as possible, to avoid an
intercontinental nuclear exchange with the United States, and to avoid a two-front war.
These objectives would be best obtained by fighting a conventional war. The main
theater of military action would be the Western TVD. The Northern and Southern
TVD's would be used only for flanking operations to support the main effort in central
Europe. The Soviets would probably adopt a defensive strategy in all other TVD's.
The highest priority theater mission for the Soviet forces would be the
destruction of NATO theater nuclear forces, and their means of delivery. (See Table).
This would entail immediate attacks on tactical nuclear forces with conventional forces,
while Soviet tactical nuclear forces would be held in reserve to act as a deterrent
against enemy employment of nuclear forces. The Soviet TNF would be kept in rear
areas safe from enemy conventional forces. Therefore, during the course o[ the conflict
the nuclear balance would shift to the Soviet side.
The critical targets of NATO TNF reportedly consist of: 150 air bases. 40-50
military bases, five naval facilities, 50 nuclear storage sites, and 30 troop staging areas,
for a total of 275 to 285 nuclear associated targets. [Ref. 21: p. 24]
Defeating NATO without nuclear weapons would depend upon the speed and
destructiveness of the initial Soviet conventional offensive. The strategy for carrying
out this offensive is composed of three parts: the air operation, the air defense
operation, and the ground operation. The timing of these attacks would be critical for
This will be explained further in Chapter Three
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the success of the military campaign. Ideally, military operations would commence
prior to NATO's force mobilization and force dispersal. Strategic warning therefore
plays a big role in the overall plan. It would greatly aid the conventional phase of the
conflict to give as little strategic warning as possible, utilizing surprise whenever
possible. Soviet military writings have stressed the importance of surprise in military
operations since 1953.
In the initial phase of the war, Soviet air strikes would attack Group I and
Group II targets. These targets are considered strategic by the Soviets because they
have the ability and capability to attack the Soviet homeland, (see Table) Soviet Long
Range Aviation would be used to strike rear areas in the theater, while Frontal
Aviation would concentrate on targets in the operational tactical area.
The air operation plan would direct Frontal Aviation and the Ground Forces to
open corridors through NATO ground based air defense, also under attack by artillery
and rockets, to prevent NATO aircraft from moving into such corridors.
Group II targets, tactical nuclear forces, would be attacked simultaneously, if
there are sufficient air assets. These targets are considered so important that Frontal
Aviation's traditional mission, support oi' the Ground Forces, would become
secondary:
In those areas where military operations will employ only conventional weapons,
neutralization of enemy nuclear weapon carrying aircraft and missiles will
constitute the major task, which will require a large number of aircraft.
Therefore only limited air power can be assigned to support ground operations.
[Ref. 22: p.26]
This suspected shortage of air assets received attention with the development of four
new aircraft, all of which have theater roles. These were the MIG-27 Flogger, the
SI- 17 Fitter, the SU- 24 Fencer (all for Frontal Aviation), and the TL-26 Backfire.
All of these new aircraft are nuclear capable, but are primarily designed for
conventional warfare.
Another part of the air operation plan directs special operation assaults on
NATO's nuclear, air, air defense assets, and command and control centers. Small teams
of special purpose troops would be used against these Group I and Group II targets.
The air defense plan has as its primary goal the task oC establishing air
superiority in order to defend Soviet and Warsaw pact forces. The Soviets would
attempt to gain the initiative through the combined offensive and defensive actions of
Frontal Aviation, artillery, and tactical surface to surface missiles.
24
The mission of the Ground Forces is also to neutralize, as rapidly as possible, the
enemy's tactical nuclear weapons:
Every gun capable of firing a nuclear warhead round and every missile launcher
should be destroyed as soon as it is spotted. Nuclear ammunition should also be
immediately destroyed as soon as it is discovered at lire positions, bases, or in
transit. [Ref. 23: p.27]
The Ground Force operation requires rapid penetration of the enemy defensive zone.
The key to the success of the operation is the application of military force under the
concept of 'combined arms':
Combined Arms, in the Soviet use of the term, requires the continuous and
detailed coordination of the combat activities of all elements of a combat force
air and ground lire support and maneuver under the control of a single
commander at every level of the combat organization from platoon up to theater
of military operations. [Ref. 24: p. 6]
The organization for this operation consists of four elements: the advanced
penetration and raiding element which would consist of 30% of the force; the first
echelon 66% of the force; the second echelon, 33% to 50% of the force; and some
reserves. The mission of the first echelon is rapid penetration and fragmentation of
NATO's forward defense. The second echelon is to enter and exploit penetrations
secured by first echelon units. Penetration and raiding would be the mission of the
OMG (operational maneuver group). The task, of the OMGs is to penetrate NATO's
lines to seize economic or political centers deep in NATO's rear area very early in the
offensive to induce in NATO the perception that continued resistance would be useless.
[Ref. 24: pp. 8-9]
The Soviets expect NATO to escalate to nuclear use in the theater due to
NATO's inability to defeat the Soviet conventional offensive. If NATO's nuclear forces
have not yet been neutralized, the Soviets would preempt in the likelihood of imminent
use of nuclear weapons by the enemy. Predicting when to strike will be difficult,
however first use is of secondary importance:
It is not the first nuclear use per se that is of concern to Soviet military planner
so much as the first decisive use of nuclear weapons in the theatre.
[Ref. 19: p.2S]
Once the Soviet political leadership authorizes the release of nuclear weapons,
Soviet military strategy calls for preemptive nuclear strikes against targets distributed
across the entire depth of the theater. Missile strikes will be initiated by ICBMs
assigned to theater targets, MRBMs, IRBMs, and SLBMs from Soviet submarines
against Group I and Group II targets. Tactical missiles deployed with the Ground
Forces will be used to provide secondary coverage of Group I and Group II targets.
Nuclear armed aircraft would be directed against mobile missile targets, mobile
command and control facilities, and for targets where collateral damage is to be
limited. [Ref. 21: p. 29]
The SS-20 did increase the options available to Soviet planners. The current
deployment of 270 SS-20 missiles can deliver 810 warheads on European targets. 5 With
only 285 critical targets, the SS-20 can cover the entire spectrum of time urgent NATO
nuclear forces. If the SS-20 missiles were removed as the result of an INF treaty, the
Soviets would still have ample nuclear missile forces to counter the critical NATO
targets.
The Soviet SS-19 ICBM could carry out the same mission as the SS-20. Sixty
SS-19 ICBM's are believed to be targeted against NATO, with six MIRV's each, these
missiles could launch 360 warheads. [Ref. 21: p. 26] The vacancy caused by the removal
ol~ the SS-20 could also be filled by SLBMs. The loss of the SS-20 and SS-4 missiles
still leaves 1159 short range missiles as well as over S.900 nuclear warheads for theater
use. The removal of the SS-20 is really numerically insignificant in view of the total
number of nuclear warheads available to the Soviets.
The military significance of the SS-20 depends on one's analytical perspective.
The SS-20 does offer increased reliability, hard target kill potential, mobility, rapid
reload and rapid preparation time for firing.
However, in terms of net nuclear damage on critical NATO nuclear targets, the
contribution of the SS-20 is not substantial. The chronic vulnerability of the
NATO forces to Soviet TNF has existed for two decades. [Ref. 21: pp. 28-29]
D. SUMMARY
Soviet military doctrine had developed strategies to cover both conventional and
theater nuclear war. The 1979 decision by NATO to deploy new intermediate-range
nuclear missiles complicated the Soviet preference to fight a conventional war vice
nuclear war. in Europe, should a conflict become necessary. It was therefore necessary
'Figures are for European deployment, not counting reloads.
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to neutralize these new NATO missiles. Chapter Three discusses the Soviet diplomatic
effort from 1979 to 1983 to persuade NATO not to deploy Pershing lis and GLCMs.
Later chapters will discuss the 1984 to 1987 period.
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III. SOVIET DIPLOMATIC AND COVERT EFFORTS1979-1983
A. SOVIET EFFORTS IN 1979
The Soviet Union engaged in a major propaganda campaign to prevent the
deployment of intermediate range nuclear missiles by NATO, from late 1979 to
November 1983.
Propaganda has long been a tool utilized in the implementation of Soviet foreign
policy against the NATO alliance. The target audience of the propaganda in the INF
issue included both the general public and the political elites of Europe. The goal was
to cause a political reversal of the decision to deploy new missiles. The campaign used
both covert and overt methods to sway public opinion against INF modernization by
NATO.
The campaign was based on some general themes which were employed on both
the covert and overt diplomatic level. These basic themes were:
1. Statements on the Military Balance
"A balance currently exits in Europe"
2. Soviet objectives and Military Doctrine
"The Soviet Union does not seek military superiority"
"The only Soviet desire is world peace"
3. United States Objectives and Motives
"The U.S. seeks military superiority"
"The U.S. is not interested in arms control"
"The U.S. seeks a first strike capability"
"The U.S. is attempting to limit a future war to Europe"
4. Military and Diplomatic Consequences
"New INF deployments will stimulate a new round in the arms race"
"It will prompt new Soviet counter deployments"
"INF host countries will become targets of Soviet missiles"
"INF deployments will increase the likelihood of a conflict"
"Will reduce future trade potential and destroy the spirit of detente"
"Will inhibit future arms control negotiations"
5. Soviet Arms Control Efforts
"Soviets seek end of the arms race"
"Soviets claim of unilateral moratorium on SS-20 missile deployments"
[Ref. 25: p.v]
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Soviet propaganda concerning the nuclear and conventional balance of forces
was emphasized during the campaign, especially on the diplomatic side. The
diplomatic elTort featured President Brezhnev, General Secretary Andropov, Foreign
Minister Gromyko, Defense Minister Ustinov, Nikolai Portugalov, and Vadim
Zagladin amongst other party members. These individuals made frequent use of
Western media sources to promulgate their propaganda themes. On 2 March 1979,
President Brezhnev formulated his claim that military parity existed between NATO
and Warsaw pact forces:
After all, it is a fact that a general military equilibrium does exist in Europe, even
if there are differences in the structure of the armed forces of each side. And it is
from this fact that one should proceed. [Ref. 26: p. 69]
Brezhnev also attempted to place the blame on NATO and the United States for
increasing tension in Europe. Meanwhile he claimed that only the Soviet Union was
trying to reach agreements that would enhance peace. This address occurred nine
months prior to the formal decision by NATO to deploy new INF missiles, and the
Soviet diplomatic effort to forestall this eventual decision was already under way.
According to Brezhnev:
To spread detente to the military sphere is today's priority task. This is
particularly necessary because the NATO bloc is feverishly building up its
armaments, complicating the situation in Europe. On our part, we are striving
for agreement on real measures to lessen the level of military confrontation on
the continent, which would strengthen the foundation of European peace.
Unfortunately there are so far no changes in this respect. [Ref. 26: p. 69]
B. SOVIET EFFORTS IN 1980
In a lengthy article in International Affairs, April 1980, N. Polyanov supported
several of the Soviet disinformation themes:
1. The claim that a military balance exists:
The most important of these is the new military balance forces in Europe and
the world; for many years now, there has been a rough equilibrium.
2. The claim that the U.S. seeks superiority over the Soviet Union:
USA intends to use Western Europe not only to achieve continental superiority
over the Warsaw Treaty countries, but also to firm up the USA's position of
strength on a global scale. ...There is even.' reason to believe the decision
imposed by the USA on its NATO partners, is seen in the United States as a
crucial component of its strategy for the 1980s, as a first step in the drive to tilt
the balance of forces in its favor.
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3. The claim that the Soviet Union does not seek superiority but only parity:
The truth is that the Soviet Union has not upset the equilibrium, but has only
taken steps to restore it by deploying medium range missiles in the western part
of the country.
4. The claim that NATO's deployment of INF missiles will increase the likelihood
of a conflict:
It is clear, however, that implementation of NATO's plans would undoubtedly
aggravate the situation in Europe and poison the international climate as a
whole. This would be detrimental to both West European countries and the
United States itself. So. as a result of the Brussels decision, they now face a
serious choice: either to assume the grave responsibility for a deterioration in
the world political climate, or to think better of it and stop short of the
dangerous move. The only reasonable choice for Europe is to abandon the
arms race and the policy of confrontation and go over to disarmament and
cooperation. [\lcf. 27: pp. 90-95]
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko noted that NATO took its 1979 decision prior
to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a cause for NATO to modernize its nuclear
forces, while also claiming that a balance of forces existed in Europe:
The course directed toward the arms race was also expressed in the recent NATO
decision which, incidentally had been taken before events in Afghanistan and
which concerns the production and deployment of U.S. medium-range nuclear
missiles in certain West European countries. The common aim of all these
actions is clear: to break the existing approximate parity, the equality in military
strength of the East and the West, or. to be more precise, of the Soviet Union
and the United States, and to try and gain superiority over the socialist
community. [Ref. 28: p.49]
The Soviets attempted to persuade NATO to abandon the decision to deploy new
medium-range nuclear missiles. This was clearly evident as Gromyko suggested that the
Soviet Union would attend disarmament talks only if the deployment decision was
overturned:
We reaffirm our readiness to attend appropriate talks on questions of
disarmament regarding Europe if the NATO decision on U.S. medium-range
nuclear missile weapons in Europe is repealed or at least if its implementation is
officially suspended. [Ref. 28: p. 50]
Gromyko was holding future arms control negotiations hostage to the abandonment of
the deplounent decision, thereby portraying the double track decision as an obstacle to
arms reductions. However, NATO made the decision that the deployment of new
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missiles might be the only way to convince the Soviets to reduce their SS-20 missile
force.
In July 19S0, during a visit by Helmut Schmidt to Moscow, the Soviets dropped
their demand that NATO abandon its plan to deploy new INF missiles prior to any
arms control negotiations. This led to preliminary U.S. -Soviet talks in October 1980 in
Geneva Switzerland. The U.S.S.R's position, at this time, was that all American
systems capable of striking Soviet territory from Europe, should be included in any
arms reduction talks concerning Europe. Moreover, the Soviets asserted, the British
and French nuclear forces should also be included with U.S. force totals in any arms
talks.
C. SOVIET EFFORTS IN 1981
In 1981, President Leonid Brezhnev announced a new tactic to forestall the
NATO INF deployment. During his address to the 26th Congress of the Communist
party of the Soviet Union on 23 February, he stated:
Whether one takes strategic nuclear arms or medium-range nuclear weapons in
Europe, in both cases approximate equality exists between the two sides. In
some types of weapons, the West has a certain advantage. In others, we have
the edge. This equality could be more enduring if relevant treaties and
agreements were concluded. ...We propose then an agreement be reached to set a
moratorium right now on the deployment in Europe of new medium-range
nuclear missiles by the NATO countries and the U.S.S.R., that a quantitative and
qualitative freeze be put on the existing level of these weapons - including.
needless to say, the U.S. forward based weapons in this region. [Ref. 2S: p. 68]
The parity claimed by Brezhnev did not exist. At the time of this address the Soviet
Union had roughly 890 medium-range nuclear warheads deployed as compared to zero
medium-range nuclear warheads for NATO. The preponderance of short range missiles
also was heavily in favor of the Soviet Union, 1,618 warheads to 380 for NATO (see
Appendix A). So a moratorium imposed at this time, prior to the deployment of the
Pershing II and Cruise Missiles, would have given the Soviets an edge oi^ 2,200
warheads.
The United States and NATO did not accept Brezhnev's February 1981 offer of a
moratorium. Brezhnev then stepped up his e (Torts to increase the apprehension o[
Europeans by stating that the new missiles would create a dangerous unstable situation
in Europe and also create an imbalance of nuclear forces:
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The unchecked nuclear arms race in Europe is becoming lethally dangerous for
all the European peoples. In order to somehow begin the practical solution of
this problem, we propose, for a start, to at least freeze the existing state of
affairs--that is, to stop the further deployment of new medium-range nuclear
missiles belonging to the U.S.S.R. and the NATO countries in the European
zone and the replacement of such missiles. It is alleged that the new Soviet
proposal is aimed at consolidating the preponderance of forces that the Warsaw
Treat}' countries supposedly have at present. Needless to say, this is not so, I
spoke about this in detail at the 26th CPSU Congress. Taking an overview of
the nuclear potential the two sides have in the European region, one sees an
approximate equilibrium of forces between the two sides. [Ref. 29: pp. 148-149]
Two months later. Brezhnev shifted his propaganda from the military balance
theme to a direct attack on U.S. arms control policy. During a dinner in honor of
President Chadi Benjedid of Algeria, on 9 June, Brezhnev lambasted the United States
and the Reagan administration.:
It is being alleged in Washington that the United States will shortly start or even
has already started talks with the Soviet Union on questions of arms control.
Unfortunately, these are mere words. I can say definitely: Not a single real step
has been made on the part of the United States so far during all the time since
the present administration came to power, either on that or other questions in
order to continue, at least in a preliminary way, discussion of the essence of these
questions. On the contrary, the Americans are delaying on various pretexts the
beginning of such a discussion while we. for our part, are prepared for it any
time. [Ref. 29: p.213]
In June 1981, Willy Brandt, Chairman of the Social Democratic party of
Germany, met with Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow. During a dinner in Brandt's honor
on 30 June, Brezhnev once again blamed the United States for holding up arms
reductions as well as implying that the double track decision would destroy the spirit of
detente:
...today there is a threat of a different kind: from detente to a new edition of
the cold war. In the present situation, we should begin with limiting the nuclear
arms race in Europe. We are ready to sit down at the negotiating table on this
question tomorrow. But, because of the U.S. position, talks have still not
begun. I can say that the U.S.S.R. is prepared to suspend the deployment of its
medium-range missiles in the European part of the country on the day that talks
begin on the substance of the matter. The U.S. striving for military superiority
over the Soviet Union undermines its stability in the international arena and
makes its own security shaky. [Ref. 29: p. 251]
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On 25 July 1981, Soviet Minister of Defense Ustinov expanded on Brezhnev's
moratorium ploy, arguing as follows:
The proposal to establish a moratorium on the deployment in Europe o[ new
medium-range nuclear missiles by NATO countries and the U.S.S.R. is a major
step of goodwill on the part of the Soviet L'nion. It suspends the arms race; it
brings in a ban on the deployment of both sides of new nuclear weapons and the
replacement of existing ones by new ones. 1 his in turn stabilizes the situation in
Europe. The proposal for a moratorium is based on rough parity in medium-
range nuclear weapons between NATO and the U.S.S.R. which has existed in
Europe for a number of years, in which both sides have about 1.000 carriers.
[Ref. 29: p. 295]
Ustinov also claimed that the planned deployment of INF missiles would alter the
nuclear balance by 50° o in NATO's favor:
In the event of the deployment in Europe of approximately 600 more American
medium-range nuclear missiles, NATO will obtain a superiority in carriers of over
50° o. [Ref. 29: p.296]
This claim was utterly ridiculous. At the end of 1980 the Soviet Union had 200 SS-20
missiles deployed for a total of 600 warheads, or 28 more warheads than the entire
planned deployment of 572 INF missiles. The disparity in numbers increased each year
in favor of the Soviet Union. [Ref. 25: p. 39]
Ustinov stated that the INF missiles would be used in a U.S. first strike against
Soviet targets, not for their stated purpose as a second strike retaliatory force:
While declaring officially that the new missiles are allegedly meant for the defense
of Western European countries, Washington in actual fact is intending them for
the inflicting of "preventative strikes" on Soviet ICBM'S and other vitally
important installations situated in the western areas of the U.S.S.R.. The main
plan of the United States is an attempt to lessen the force of a retaliatory strike
against U.S. territory in the event of aggression against the U.S.S.R. and is not
concerned with the security of Europe. [Ref. 29: p.296]
On 24 September 1981, the United States and the Soviet Union announced that
formal negotiations on reductions of intermediate range nuclear missiles in I'urope
would begin in Geneva Switzerland, on 30 November 19S1. Ambassador Paul Nitze
would head the U.S. delegation and Ambassador Y.A. Kvitsinsky would represent the
Soviet Union.
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On 2 November 1981 Brezhnev took his propaganda campaign straight to the
German people in an interview that was published in German in Der Spiegel magazine.
In response to the question of how he viewed East-West relations, detente, and the
world situation, Brezhnev responded with comments that reiterated the Soviet
disinformation themes:
The Soviet Union does not threaten anybody, is not planning to attack anyone.
Our military doctrine is of a defensive character. It rules out preventative wars
and the first strike concept. I can also say with all responsibility that the Soviet
Union will under no circumstances use nuclear weapons against the states which
have renounced their production and acquisition and do not have it on their
territory.
If another almost 600 new American missiles are additionally deployed in
Western Europe. NATO will receive a 50% advantage as regards carriers, and
almost a 100° o advantage as regards nuclear charges. Everything in the official
explanations of the plans for the deployment of new U.S. nuclear missiles in
Europe is false, from the beginning to the end. It is a falsehood that all this is
additional armament in answer to the defiance of the Soviet Union, which
allegedly, refused to hold talks on medium-range weapons. It is a falsehood that
the United States decided to deploy its new missiles in Western Europe only in
reply to the request of its allies and being motivated, exclusively, by the concern
about their security. [Ref. 29: pp.525-531]
President Ronald Reagan stated his support for the 12 December 1979 "double
track" decision, during an address to the National press Club, on 18 November 1981.
This address discussed U.S.- Soviet relations particularly in the area of arms control.
During this speech he made a proposal which became known as the "zero option":
The United States is prepared to cancel its deployment of Pershing II and ground
launched cruise missiles if the Soviets will dismantle their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5
missiles. This would be a historic step. [Ref. 30: p. 17)
This address by Reagan, however, did not quiet the critics of his arms control policy
and the "zero option" was not considered a serious proposal in Moscow.
President Brezhnev continued his appeal to the West Germans during a dinner in
Bonn in his honor, hosted by Chancellor Schmidt, 23 November 1981. During
Brezhnev's address he reiterated the same themes he voiced during the past year.
However he did propose a new wrinkle, the offer of a unilateral reduction by the Soviet
3:>
As an act of goodwill, we could unilaterally reduce a part of our medium-range
nuclear weapons in the European part of the U.S.S.R. [Ref. 29: p. 619]
This unilateral offer was not specific and was followed by the claim that the Soviet
Union desired all nuclear weapons removed from Europe:
Generally speaking we stand for Europe becoming eventually free from nuclear
weapons, both medium-range and tactical ones. That would be genuine "zero
option" which would be just for all the sides. [Ref. 29: p. 619)
An example of the use of Western media for Soviet propaganda purposes is an
article by Nikolai Portugalov, published in NATO's Fifteen Nations Oct-Nov 1981.
Portugalov is a senior official of the International Information Department of the
L'.S.S.R.. The article discusses the nuclear balance in Europe and contains the same
disinformation themes voiced by other Soviet officials:
Behind all talk about the desire to prevent the violation of the equilibrium is a
screen for the United States drive to gain unilateral advantages in the strategic
field to the detriment of Europe at the expense of its security, political stability,
economic health, and particularly money. Approximate parity has been
maintained between NATO and the U.S.S.R. in the field of medium-range
nuclear missile systems in Europe for a number of years now - about 1.000 units
on each side. [Ref. 31: pp.40-41]
D. SOVIET EFFORTS IN 1982
Formal INF negotiations began on 30 November 1981 and were recessed on 16
March 1982. During this first round the U.S. presented a draft treaty, on 2 February
1982. which represented President Reagan's "zero option" proposal of 18 November
1981. The treaty called for the cancellation of the deployment of Pershing II and
GLCMs and for the Soviet Union to dismantle all SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles in
Europe. The Soviet position consisted of a moratorium, by both sides, on the
deployment of any new nuclear missiles for the duration of the talks, and also for equal
reductions in systems. The reductions would be of medium-range systems in Europe,
and in the waters adjacent to Europe, down to 600 by 1985, and down to 300 by 1990.
Medium range was defined as systems with a combat radius range of 1000km, the
agreement would expire in 1990.
Soviet President Brezhnev officially announced a moratorium on deployment of
intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe, during an address to the Congress of
Soviet trade Unions, 16 March 1982:
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We are freezing, in both the quantitative and qualitative respects: the armaments
of this kind already stationed here, and are suspending the replacement of old
missiles, known as the SS-4 and SS- 5, by newer SS-20 missiles. This moratorium
will be in force either until an agreement is reached with the United States to
reduce, on the basis of parity and equal security, the medium-range nuclear
weapons designed for use in Europe, or until the time, if and when, the U.S.
leaders, disregarding the security of nations, actually go over the practical
preparations to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe. [Ref. 32: p. 119]
The intent of this announcement was to convey to the world the impression that
the Soviet Union was inspired by peaceful motives. The Soviets would cease
deployment of missiles while the U.S. and NATO were planning to install new
missiles. The content of Brezhnev's address was given wide dissemination in the West,
to the extent that President Reagan felt compelled to comment about it during a press
conference three days later:
A unilateral freeze leaves them with 300 missiles and 900 warheads aimed at
Western Europe - against nothing. But as I say. this is a pretty easy freeze you
know, there were 250 of these missiles when we started to negotiate when I made
my speech on November ISth. There are now 300. And its pretty easy to freeze
when you're 3O0-0. [Ref. 32: p. 121]
A freeze at this point would legitimize and perpetuate Soviet superiority in
intermediate range missiles. A stop of the U.S. deployments would negate the NATO
double track decision and cause dissension within the NATO alliance allowing the
Soviet Union to continue on its path to hegemony over Europe.
The second round of the INF talks began on 2 May 1982 and ended 20 July
19S2. During this phase the Soviets presented a draft treaty embodying their position
as discussed in the first round. The session ended with no agreement or movement on
either of the two proposed draft treaties.
During a news interview on 19 August, 1982, Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov
once again claimed that a balance of forces was the goal of the Soviet Union, not
superiority:
U.S. Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, in an interview to American
journalists on August 9th, stated that all activities of the Pentagon are directed at
attaining superiority over the U.S.S.R in a nuclear war and at concluding it on
terms advantageous to the United States. He said that the nuclear capability of
the U.S. should be superior to those of the Soviet Union at all stages of such a
war. The Soviet Union rejects as a matter of principle the course of attaining
military superiority. It does not aspire to it but neither does it recognize such a
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right in the case of anybody else. Military balance on the lowest possible levels
of armaments - such is the L'.S.S.R.'s constructive approach to nuclear
disarmament. [Ref. 32: p. 532]
In November 1982, with the death of Leonid Brezhnev the leadership of the
Soviet Union passed to Yuri Andropov. However, this leadership change did not slow
down or alter the Soviet propaganda machine against NATO INF deployments. On 21
December 1982 Andropov addressed the Central Committee and Supreme Soviet of the
U.S.S.R. on nuclear arms reductions proposals. This address contained the same
themes previously articulated by Brezhnev:
The war preparation of the United States and the NATO bloc which it leads have
grown to an unheard record scale. Our position on this issue is clear! A nuclear
war whether big or small, must not be allowed to break, out. No task is more
important today than to stop the instigators of another war. At present, that
continent is beset by a new danger - the prospect of several hundred U.S.
missiles being deployed in Western Europe. I have got to say bluntly: This
would make peace still more fragile. [Ref. 32: p.92 1
J
E. SOVIET EFFORTS IN 1983
While Brezhnev had often commented that the balance of forces in Europe,
including all nuclear forces such as U.S. "forward based systems", Andropov put new
emphasis not on American forward basing but on British and French nuclear forces.
He linked any intermediate range missile reduction to the reduction of British and
French nuclear missiles:
We are prepared, among other things, to agree that the Soviet Union should
retain in Europe only as many missiles as are kept by Britain and France - and
not a single one more. [Ref. 32: p.92 1]
This proposal was criticized by both American and NATO otficials. During a
press interview on 19 January 1983, NATO Secretary General Luns, commented:
The French and British nuclear weapons do not belong to NATO, they serve
national purposes. [Ref. 33: p. 21]
The Reagan administration rejected the Soviet proposal of including British and French
nuclear systems in any negotiations.
The fourth round of INF talks began on 27 January 1983. The United States
continued to push for the "zero option" draft treaty but indicated that flexibility was
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possible. The Soviets modified their position slightly by proposing a reduction of SS-
20 missiles to 162 missiles (providing no deployment of Pershing II and GLCMs). a
level they equated to British and French nuclear forces.
On 30 March 19S3, the day after the fourth round ended, President Reagan
announced a new proposal in order to move the negotiations along:
When it comes to intermediate nuclear missiles in Europe, it would be better to
have none than to have some. But if there must be some, it is better to have few
than many. If the Soviets will not now agree to the total elimination of these
weapons. I hope they will at least join us in an interim agreement that would
substantially reduce these forces to equal levels on both sides. To this end,
Ambassador Paul Nitze has informed his Soviet counterpart that we are prepared
to negotiate an interim agreement in which the United States would substantially
reduce its planned deployment of Pershing II and ground launched cruises
missiles, provided the Soviet Union reduces the number of its warheads on longer
range INF missiles to an equal level on a global basis. [Ref. 33: p. 229]
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko expounded on the Andropov line in a news
conference on 2 April 19S3. Gromyko took issue with Reagan's "interim proposal":
First, it does not take the British and French medium-range nuclear weapons,
including 162 missiles, into account; second, it does not take many hundreds of
American nuclear carrying aircraft based in Western Europe and on aircraft
carriers into account. As a whole, if NATO now has a 1 1,2 superiority in
medium-range nuclear warheads in Europe, then in the event of the president's
interim option, NATO would have almost 2 and 12 times as many such
warheads as the Soviet Union has. [Ref. 33: p. 263]
This claim of 2 12 times the warheads of the Soviet Union was not substantiated by
Grormko with any factual data or figures. As previously discussed even with the new
INF deployment the Soviets would still have had an edge in numbers of missiles and
warheads.
An often reiterated theme during the propaganda campaign was the alleged U.S.
plan to limit nuclear war to Europe. On 6 April 1983, Soviet Defense Minister
Ustinov, while trying to support that theme, reinforced NATO's idea of extended
deterrence. He claimed that U.S. military doctrine called for limited nuclear war in
Europe and commented that the Soviet Union would retaliate not only against Europe
for any attack launched from Europe, but also against the United States. This
comment was just what the Europeans wanted, extended nuclear deterrence, ensuring
linkage between the U.S. and land based nuclear forces in Europe:
A particular threat to the cause of peace is embodied in the U.S. and NATO
plan to deploy hundreds more American medium-range nuclear missiles in West
Europe. According to the pentagon's calculations, this will supposedly increase
U.S. survivability in the event of conflict. In fact the United States is placing
NATO allies under the threat of retaliatory nuclear strike and making them
hostages to its nuclear strategy. For the majority of West European countries
where American nuclear weapons are to be deployed, that retaliatory strike
could be the last. Nor will the United States escape with impunity in that event.
If Washington is calculating the we will retaliate to the use of Pershings and
cruise missiles only against targets in West Europe, it is profoundly deluded.
Retribution will inevitably follow against the U.S. itself too. [Ref. 33: p. 301]
Soviet General Secretary Andropov following his former predecessor's example,
granted an interview to Der Spiegel, magazine on 24 April 1983. He used this
opportunity to restate all the Soviet propaganda themes. The trend of the article was
that the U.S. and NATO were increasing the risk of war by planning new missile
deployments, while the Soviet Union truly desired arms reductions that would reduce
the threat of war:
The purpose of the U.S. at the Geneva talks, as it has transpired, is to add at all
cost new powerful armaments to the already existing vast nuclear arsenal of
NATO. And it is only Soviet missiles that it wants to reduce. And as for the
Geneva talks, it is known that the present U.S. administration has entered them
with great reluctance. At the same time, when evaluating the prospects of our
relations [U.S.S.R & FRG} we cannot, naturally, abstract ourselves from the
plans of deploying new American nuclear missiles in the FRG. Judge for
yourself what a damage would be inflicted to these relations if the territory of the
FRG was turned into a bridgehead for delivering a nuclear strike at the U.S.S.R
and its allies. Should this happen this would mean most grave consequences for
the FRG itself. [Ref. 33: p.368]
The fifth round of talks commenced on 17 May 1983 and recessed on 14 July
1^83. Following up on the interim proposal suggested by President Reagan on 30
March 19S3, the United States proposed a global limit of 420 intermediate-range
nuclear warheads on 16 June. The interim proposal' suggested a limit of anywhere
between 50 and 450 warheads worldwide, if the Soviets agreed to reduce their number
of SS-20 warheads to the same number of deployed U.S. INF. This session ended with
no movement towards an agreement.
In an interview in Pravda, 27 August 1983, Andropov once again linked arms
reductions to British and French nuclear forces:
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...we declared our readiness to retain in Europe, after the reductions, as many
medium-range missiles as the British and French possess. [Ref. 33: p. 761]
The sixth round of INF talks commenced on 6 September 1983. During a speech
to the United Nations General Assembly, President Reagan, on 26 September 1983,
made three proposals concerning the INF negotiations:
If the Soviet I'nion agrees to reductions and limits on a global basis, the U.S.
for its part will not offset the entire Soviet global missile deployment through
U.S. deployments in Europe. ...The U.S. will consider mutually acceptable ways
to address the Soviet desire that an agreement should limit aircraft as well as
missiles. ...The U.S. will address the mix of missiles that would result from
reductions. [Ref. 33: p. 702]
The most significant proposal, of the three mentioned, was Reagan's offer to discuss
limits on aircraft. Previously Reagan did not want to include any limitations on aircraft
in the INF negotiations, however, it was an attempt to show some flexibility to move
the negotiations along. There was little positive response from Moscow concerning
Reagan's speech.
In an interview in Pravda, Andropov proposed a new Soviet position on INF
missile destruction instead of simple "removal" of missiles:
Today I can report our readiness to take one more big step. In the event of
reaching a mutually acceptable agreement, including the U.S. abandonment of
the deployment of - missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union, in reducing its
medium-range missile- in the European part of the country to a level equal to the
number of British and French missiles, would liquidate all the missiles so reduced.
[Ref. 33: p.762]
The significance of this proposal is twofold: it still makes U.S. cancellation of the INF
deployments a precondition, and it shows no change or movement from earlier Soviet
positions.
Andropov commented on the progress of INF talks in an interview on 27
October 1983. He proposed to reduce SS-20 missiles down to 140, and as usual, he
blamed the United States for lack of progress:
As long as the United States adheres to its unrealistic, one-sided position,
according to which the U.S.S.R is supposed to reduce its medium-range nuclear
arms while the U.S. and its Atlantic treaty allies increase theirs, it is of course
impossible to count on progress at the talks. [Ref. 33: p. 91 1]
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This would have been a reduction from the previous offer of 243 launchers to 140
launchers, which does not match Reagan's 30 March 1983 proposal of 420 warheads.
Andropov also made reference to the Soviet moratorium on deployment of
medium-range nuclear missiles:
I would remind people that 1 and 1 2 years ago the imposed a moratorium on
the deployment of missiles in its European part. And, despite all the slanders,
this moratorium is being unswervingly observed. [Ref. 33: p.9 1 2]
During the 1 and 1 2 year moratorium the Soviet deployment of SS-20 missile
launchers increased from 300 to 351, with a concurrent increase from 900 to 1,053
warheads. [Ref. 25: p. 39]
Andropov in his concluding answer, during the interview, threatened to cancel
the existing talks if new missiles were deployed:
The appearance of new American missiles in West Europe will make it impossible
to continue the talks now being held in Geneva. [Ref. 33: p.9 14)
On 14 November 1983, the first cruise missiles scheduled for NATO deployment
arrived in England. Two days later, on 16 November, The Italian Chamber of Deputies
endorsed the NATO deployment of new INF by a vote of 351-291-1. On 22 November,
after a two day debate, the West German Parliament approved NATO's deployment of
new INF missiles by a vote of 286-226-1. [Ref. 34: p. 787] In response to these events.
Yuri Andropov carried out his previous threat of ending the INF talks, on 23
November 1983:
The decisions taken the past few days by the governments of the Federal
Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy show unequivocally that
despite the will of their own peoples, despite the security interests of their
countries and despite the interests of European and universal peace, those
governments have given the green light to the deployment of U.S. missiles. The
Soviet Union considers its further participation in those talks impossible.
[Ref. 33: p.1008]
The NATO "double track" decision had survived five years of intense diplomatic




Diplomatic efforts were one side of the Soviet attack against INF deployment.
the other tactic was the use of covert or "active measures". These active measures
included the use of agents of influence, local communist parties, international front
organizations and false letters and forgeries.
The INF campaign was apparently orchestrated by the Central Committee's
International Department. It is the principal organization responsible for the
formulation, execution, oversight and monitoring of active measures worldwide. The
International Information Department, a subset of the International Department,
created in 1978, was the center of the entire propaganda effort against the West. A
critical working unit within the International Department is the Committee for State
Security, or KGB. Service A' of the KGB'S foreign intelligence directorate plans,
coordinates and implements operations such as forgeries and other covert operations.
[Ref. 35: pp. 27-35]
One of the most important tools used by the Soviet Union in the INF campaign
was manipulation of the "peace movement". The basic goal was to sharpen European
memories of the destruction of World War II and transpose that fear into a movement
against Western nuclear weapons. Over the years Soviet methods have become
increasingly more sophisticated as they attempt to have people support Soviet policy
unwittingly by convincing them that they are supporting something else:
Ever since the founding of NATO, it has been Moscow's publicly expressed
intention to court the West European public by a variety of "peace offensives"
directed at dismantling the Western defensive system or splitting the alliance.
[Ref. 36: p.42]
The Soviets have a long history of exploiting peace movements. In their
campaign against INF they used a vast variety of religious groups. They value church-
affiliated movements because of the prestige and credibility that the presence of religion
bestows on the movements. The KGB has established special centers in the L.S.S.R.
to train agents for the specific mission of working with religious movements in Western
Europe and elsewhere. [Ref. 14: p. 13]
While not all peace movements are Soviet-controlled, it is largely through Soviet
instigated direction and coordination that the peace movement adopts an anti-
American orientation. Moscow exploits the existence of numerous groups in Western
Europe that are initially attracted to the peace movement for widely different reasons.
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Once they participate in the peace activities, they are captivated by the slogans and the
emotional appeal. It is remarkable that they often protested against U.S. weapons
even before they were deployed yet ignored the existence of Soviet weapons and denied
that any military imbalance existed. This attitude helps to create pressure against
Western governments to relax their defense efforts and make concessions to the Soviets
in arms control, all in the quest for peace. The Soviet Union funnels financial support
to organizations active in peace movements through a variety of channels. The CIA
estimates that the activities of the World Peace Council, the Christian Peace Council,
and eleven other international front organizations cost the Soviet Union about S63
million per year. [Ref. 14: p. 13]
The most important front organizations in the INF campaign were: the World
Peace Council (WPC), the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), and the
Christian Peace Conference (CPC). The WPC was founded in 1949 and has over 137
affiliates around the world. Its headquarters is in Helsinki. The defacto leader of the
WPC is Vitaly Shaposhnikov, a Deputy of the International Department, who is in
charge of Soviet front operations. The WFTU was founded in 1945 and is
headquartered in Prague. It claims 206 million members in 90 national organizations.
The WFTU, in 1981, established the International Trade Union Committee for Peace
and Disarmament with the purpose of infiltrating non-communist trade unions. The
CPC was founded in 1958 and is also located in Prague. It has atfiliates in 80
countries. This front was very active in encouraging Western church groups to join the
peace movement during the INF campaign. [Ref. 37: pp. 22-24)
The West European peace movement sprang from its origins in the Netherlands.
The idea was to Europeanize the movement. The success o^ the neutron bomb
campaign led leaders of the "Stop the Neutron Bomb'' movement to broaden its scope.
At the February 1979 World Peace Council meeting in East Berlin, the slogan "Stop
the Arms Race!" surfaced as the main demand in the struggle for peace. The target
quickly became the NATO "double track" decision of 1979.
1. Peace Movement Operations in West Germany
West Germany was considered the prime target by the Soviet Union because it
was the only state planning to accept U.S. deployments of Pershing II missiles. In
November 1980, a meeting of various groups was held in Krefeld, West Germany. The
theme of this meeting was that "nuclear death threatens us all no to nuclear missiles in
Europe". This movement became known as the Krefeld Appeal and by June 19S1 it
44
had reportedly amassed over one million signatures. The movement was conceived,
financed, and controlled by German Communist party affiliated groups: the German
Peace Union (DFU) which was a branch of the World Peace Council and the
Committee for Peace, Disarmament, and Cooperation (KFAZ). In June 1983,
supposedly over four million Germans supported the "Krefeld Appeal". [Ref. 37: p. 37]
A mass demonstration was held in Bonn on 10 October 1981. It was
organized by the ASF and the AGDF, and both groups received large communist
backing. Twenty six of the seventy organizations that participated in the
demonstration were backed by the DKP. Six of the fifteen speakers at the rally were
pro-Soviet. There were 300,000 people present at this demonstration. On 4 April 1982
a conference was held to plan the 10 June rally. Fight hundred representatives were
present of which over two thirds were from DKP-sponsored groups. Four of the six
members on the coordinating committee were from the DKP. The theme of the 10
June rally was "No to new missiles in Europe". It was timed to protest a NATO
summit meeting and President Reagan's visit to West Germany. Over 300,000 attended
the 10 June demonstration. [Ref. 37: p. 39]
In 1982 the German Communist Party revived the Easter peace Marches. The
German Peace Union (DFU) was the main organizer and its effort resulted in over 90
marches throughout the country, with over 500,000 participants.
The largest organization involved in the peace movement was the Greens.
This was originally a group of environmentalists but were influenced in some cases by
Communists. Petra Kelly, leader of the Greens, demanded the inclusion of U.S.
forward based systems and the British and French nuclear forces in the Geneva arms
talks, parroting the Soviet position. A rift developed between the Greens and the pro-
Soviet organizations at the April planning conference for the 10 June demonstration.
The Greens wanted to include opposition to the Soviet SS-20 missiles as well as
American missiles; however, the pro-Soviet coalitions won out. Nevertheless the
Communists did lose some influence in the Greens organization. [Ref. 38: p. 17]
2. Peace Movement Operations in France
A large peace demonstration was held in Paris on 25 October 1981. It was
organized by the Movement for Peace, a front organization of the French Communist
Party (PCF), and by the communist dominated General Confederation of Labor
(CGT). The demonstration in Paris was not quite as one-sided as those in Germany as
its slogan was : "Neither Pershing nor SS-20, but disarmament". This approach was
not quite normal for the PCF:
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Although it is generally pro-Moscow, the PCF has taken care to have a ballanced
approach in its official position on the issue of nuclear weapons. [Ref. 36: p. 51]
3. Peace Movement Operations in Italy
A major peace demonstration took place in Rome on 24 October 1981
opposing the deployment of American cruise missiles. It was arranged by the
Committee for Disarmament (an organization set up by the Italian Communist party
(PCI)), Pax Chnsti, and the Catholic Left. The PCI however, often follows its own
way as it favors a Europe independent of both superpowers. [Ref. 36: p.51]
4. Peace Movement Operations in Great Britain
The British peace movement was spear headed by the Campaign for Nuclear
Disarmament. This group is not a traditional communist front, but, four of its twenty
National Council members belong to the British Communist party. This is somewhat
significant, in view of the small size of the British Communist party. The Greenham
Common Women staged a long protest vigil against U.S. based nuclear forces in
England. The British Labor party has adopted a platform to remove all American
nuclear forces from England and with its movement to the left it has overshadowed the
other movements. [Ref. 14: p.50]
5. Peace Movement Operations in Holland and Belgium
Within Holland the most influential group has been the Interchurch Peace
Council (IKV). It was founded in 1967, and gained notoriety in 1977 during the
neutron bomb campaign. It has benefited from Soviet support but now has adopted a
nonaligned posture. The IKV has been critical of Moscow's handling of Poland and
has voiced a theme of Europe without superpower blocs.
In Belgium the most important organization is the Pax Christi, which has also
recently declared itself as being nonaligned. The Belgian Communist Party (KPB) has
been active in the peace movement. The 25 October 1981 demonstration was
organized by the Flemish Action Committee against Nuclear Weapons (VAKA) and
the National Committee for Peace and Development (CNAPD). Both these groups
were created through KPB initiatives. In 1981 the KPB adopted the slogan: "Neither
cruise missile, nor Pershing II, nor SS-20"; however, they usually adhere to the Soviet
line. [Ref. 36: p.54]
6. Forgeries
KGB-sponsored forgeries were also a part of the effort against the deployment
of INF missiles. On 22 April 1982, the Belgian leftist weekly, De Nieuve, printed a
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bogus letter dated 26 June 1979 from General Haig to NATO Secretary General Luns.
It discussed potential first strike operations and advocated action to jolt those groups
opposing INF deployments. The publication was timed to influence anti-nuclear
demonstrations in the spring of 19S2. [Ref. 39: p.l.]
The Soviets surfaced a doctored version of actual U.S. documents which had
been passed to the KGB in the 1900s by Sergeant Robert Lee Johnson; between 1980
and 1981 versions of these documents appeared eleven times in Western Europe.
[Ref. 39: p. 16]
In November 1981, a Norwegian activist, Bjaine Eikeford, published an article
claiming he had possession of U.S. war plans which called for nuclear bombing of
Norwegian targets. [Ref. 39: p. 16]
G. SUMMARY
The goal of the Soviet Union was to prevent the deployment of Pershing II
nuclear missiles and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles. West Germany, Great Britain,
and Italy all accepted their assigned forces beginning in 1983. Therefore the Soviet
INF campaign failed, at least with respect to its maximum objective. The NATO
Nuclear Planning Group supported the "double track" decision throughout the
propaganda campaign. NATO was not convinced by the Soviet rhetoric that the
nuclear balance was even. Each and every communique issued by NATO, during this
time frame, stated their concern of the imbalance in favor of the Soviets.
The Soviet propaganda campaign and their negotiations policy at Geneva were
aimed at preventing the deployment of Pershing II and GLCM's in Europe. As
negotiations were terminated on 23 November 1983, both sides had yielded little from
their initial positions. The United States position at this time was basically the zero
option proposal of 18 November 1981. The Soviets basic position had not changed: a
moratorium on all new deployments of medium range systems. The Soviets still tied
reductions to British and French nuclear forces, but had proposed to reduce the SS-20
missiles to 140. The Soviet walkout from the INF talks as well as the START
negotiations was a final effort to sway public opinion against the deployment of
Pershing II and GLCMs.
The Soviet walkout did nothing to stop the deployment of Pershing lis and
GLCMs. What happened after the walkout is discussed in the next chapter.
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IV. 1984-1987: THE SOVIETS RETURN TO INF NEGOTIATIONS
A. NEGOTIATIONS IN 1984
In April 1984, Konstantin U. Chernenko succeeded Yuri Andropov as the leader
of the Soviet Union. This change in leadership, however, did not result in a shift in
Soviet policy regarding the INF negotiations. Chernenko's position was that the
United States must remove the newly deployed INF missiles before arms reduction
talks could resume. The other prevalent theme in Chernenko's dialogue was the
subject of prohibiting space weapons. In an interview in Pravda, on 2 September 1984,
he commented on the purpose of potential arms talks:
What subject does the Soviet Union propose to discuss at the talks? The subject
would be that oC precluding the possibility of the spread of the arms race into
outer space and fully renouncing strike space systems, including anti-satellite
weapons. In other words, the aim would be to ensure that there is no threat to
Earth of war from outer space, and no threat to outer space of war from Earth
or from space itself. [Ref. 40: p. 660]
During this interview, he once again blamed the breakdown in negotiations on the U.S.
deployment of INF missiles. Chernenko did not, however, insist or mention the
previous condition that the missiles must be removed prior to the start of any arms
negotiations.
The friction between the Reagan administration and Moscow was eased
somewhat with the 22 November 1984 announcement that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
had agreed to enter into new arms reduction negotiations. Secretary of State George
Shultz and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko would meet in Geneva Switzerland on
7-8 January 19S5, to set the objectives and subjects of the negotiations.
Why, after a year of Soviet propaganda against any future talks, did the Soviets
decide to shift positions? The Soviet propaganda of 1984 had not stopped the
deployment of new INF missiles to Europe. Since not talking was not producing the
desired results, it made sense to return to negotiations to attempt to halt the
modernization of the West's posture. Also, Ronald Reagan had just been reelected for
another four \eur term, and it appeared that Reagan was not about to unilaterally stop
the deployment of Pershing lis and GLCMs.
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The Kremlin, on the other hand, appears to realize that the tactic of boycotting
the U.S. does not payofT. The Soviet obstructionism was intended to serve as a
sort of shock, therapy on West European and American opinion. Instead, it was
widely viewed in the West as a nasty but cheap brand of blackmail.
[Ref. 41: p. 24]
B. NEGOTIATIONS IN 1985
The results of the 7-S January 1985 meeting between Shultz and Gromyko were
that new arms control negotiations would be resumed. They agreed to form three
interconnected arms talks. One would focus on space, one on intermediate-range
weapons in Europe, and one on strategic nuclear amis. The Soviets prime concern was
still outer space, while the U.S. emphasized the INF and START phases of the
negotiations. Gromyko stressed the importance of the space weapons section of the
talks in his remarks after the meeting:
The conversation addressed acute problems concerning cessation of the arms race
and the removal of the threat of nuclear war. The Soviet side particularly
stressed the importance of preventing the militarization of outer space.
[Ref. 42: p. 10]
On 12 March 1985, the first U.S. - Soviet arms talks in fifteen months opened in
Geneva Switzerland. The United States team consisted of: Max M. Kampelman
(Space and Defense Weapons). John G. Tower (Strategic Arms), and Maynard W.
Glitman (INF). The Soviets were represented by: Yuli A. Kvitsinsky (Space and
Defense Weapons who had previously been the chief negotiator in the 1981-1983 INF
talks), Victor P. Karpov (Strategic Arms), and Alexsei Obukhov (INF - who had been
deputy to Karpov during the 1982-1983 START talks). Glitman had been deputy to
Nitze during the INF talks in 1981-1983.
On 11 March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev was named as the successor to
Chernenko. In his maiden speech as the Communist Party leader, Gorbachev said that
Moscow favored a nuclear weapons freeze and a ban on all space weapons.
Gorbachev, on 6 April during an interview in Pravda, announced a unilateral freeze on
the deployment of SS-20 missiles until November [Ref. 43: p. 15]. This freeze was
viewed as nothing new and also as a propaganda stunt to stop the further deployment
of Pershing lis and GLCMs. The U.S. was not interested in a freeze but in the
reduction of SS- 20s. Deputy press secretary Larry Spcakes commented: "If they want
a freeze fine, but thats not enough". [Ref. 44: p. 3] A freeze at this time would result in
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the Soviets having an advantage of 270 SS-20s in Europe, versus 54 Pershing lis and
4S GLCMs. [Ref. 45: p.l]
The first round of the talks ended on 23 April 1985 with little progress achieved.
These new' negotiations were spent reiterating previous positions. The Soviets were
treating the talks as a package deal, while the Americans maintained that progress in
one area should not be held hostage to the other areas.
As the second round of talks started on 30 May 1985, Gorbachev voiced a
position often iterated during Andropov's reign:
We would not have a grain more than the French and British have, either in the
number of missiles or warheads. [Ref. 46: p. 9]
He also offered to scrap Europe based missiles if the U.S. abandoned the SDI
program, adding that:
We have already suggested that both sides reduce strategic offensive arms by 1 '4
by way of an opening move. ...We have no objections to making deeper mutual
cuts. ...All this is possible if the arms race does not begin in space. [Ref. 47: p.l]
The second round ended 16 July 1985, with each side blaming the other for the lack of
progress.
The third round of INF talks opened on 19 September 1985. Gorbachev, during
a speech in Paris on 7 October 1985, announced that the Soviet Union was reducing its
arsenal of SS-20s in Western Europe to 243, while proposing separate talks on
European missiles with the French and the British. Gorbachev also proposed a freeze
in Europe as well as Asia. [Ref. 48: p.l]
On 1 November 1985, President Reagan proposed that medium range missile
forces be limited to 140 in Europe, and that the Soviets make a proportionate cut in
Asia. The limit of 140 was chosen because that was the number of INT missiles
expected to be in place by the end of 1985. The Soviets proposed a limit of 120 U.S.
GLCMs and 243 SS-20s in Europe, and 144 SS-20s in Asia. This Soviet offer therefore
would ban all Pershing lis from Europe. This round ended with these proposals on the
table on 7 November 1985. [Ref. 49: p.l]
Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev met in Geneva Switzerland, 19-21
November 1985, for a summit conference. Little was achieved, but both signed a joint
statement calling for a 50° o cut in strategic weapons. This statement did not include a
single mention of Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, and also called for earlv
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progress on an interim INF agreement. This was thought to mean that the Soviets
were accepting the U.S. position of separating out the INF agreement from the two
other areas.
...Noting the proposals recently tabled by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, they
called for early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground,
including the principle of 50 percent reductions in the nuclear arms of the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R. appropriately applied, as well as the idea of an interim INF
agreement. [Ref. 50: p. 15]
C. NEGOTIATIONS IN 1986
Just before the fourth round of INF talks opened on 16 January 1986, Mikhail
Gorbachev proposed a plan (on 15 January 1986) to eliminate nuclear weapons by the
year 2000. Part of this proposal called for the elimination of all Soviet and U.S. INF
in Europe. This was the first time that the Soviets indicated a willingness to remove all
their SS-20s from Europe. All previous proposals called for the elimination of all U.S.
Pershing lis and GLCMs, but with the Soviet Union retaining enough SS-20s to
counter the French and British nuclear forces.
On 6 February 1986, during a three day visit to Moscow by Senator Edward
Kennedy, Gorbachev announced that an INF accord was possible without a space
arms connection. The only condition on the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet
medium range missiles in Europe was for the French and British to pledge not to
expand or modernize their nuclear arms and for the U.S. not to transfer nuclear
weapons delivery systems to them. [Ref. 51: p.l]
Reagan responded to Gorbachev's January proposal on 24 February 1986, by
offering in Geneva two options: the first was a phased reduction to 140 launchers on
each side during the first year, a reduction to 70 on each side the second year, and to
zero by the third year, with a proportionate cut in Asia. The second option was to
make reductions in Europe first: followed by a 50°/ o initial cutback in Asia. This
proposal did not, of course, include any guarantee by the U.S. that France and Britain
would not modernize their weapons nor did it include any U.S. guarantee not to
transfer weapons to Britain or France. This offer was not viewed with enthusiasm in
Moscow. The round adjourned 3 March 19S6. [Ref. 52: p. 3]
The fifth round of the INF negotiations commenced on 8 May 1986. The
Soviets proposed a draft treaty that all intermediate-range nuclear missiles be
eliminated from Europe. This proposal was a formal version of the oiler made by
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Gorbachev in January. This proposal called for the elimination of INF missiles in
Europe over a period of five to seven years. This round ended on 26 June 1986.
The sixth round of arms control talks started 18 September 1986, with both sides
making proposals. The Soviets proposed a ceiling of 100 INF warheads for each side
in Europe, and offered token reductions in Asia. The U.S. counter offer was 100
warheads in Europe for each side, and 100 Soviet warheads in Asia, with the U.S.
permitted to match the Soviet allowance in Asia. These offers were on the table in
Geneva when Reagan and Gorbachev met in Reykjavik for their second summit.
On 11 and 12 October 19S6, President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Premier
Mikhail Gorbachev conducted a summit meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland. While there
were no final agreements reached on any arms reductions, the proposals that were later
made public met with criticism from both the United States and European NATO
officials. Reagan and Gorbachev very nearly reached an agreement on the 'zero
option' proposal for INF missiles in Europe, and the agreement was prevented by
Gorbachev's linking oi" restrictions on SDI to any INF reductions. Reagan refused to
allow any linking of limits on SDI to any of the arms control reductions discussed, and
no agreements were concluded.
At the summit Gorbachev proposed the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet long
range intermediate nuclear missile forces from European soil. The Soviet Union would
be allowed to deploy 100 SS-20 warheads in Asia, while the U.S. would be allowed to
deploy 100 warheads in the United States. Gorbachev also proposed a freeze on the
deployment of shorter-range missile forces. Reagan agreed to this, with the proviso
that the U.S. be allowed to match the Soviet number of shorter-range missiles.
Reagan agreed to these proposals until Gorbachev indicated that an INF treaty would
also require the United States to limit research on anti-missile defenses to the
laboratory. Since 6 February 1986, Gorbachev had stated that an INF agreement
would not be held hostage to any limitation on SDI; now with an agreement almost in
hand, he reversed his position by once again linking INF to SDI.
The Soviets presented a proposal on 7 November 19S6 in Geneva, based on
Gorbachev's summit plan, that INF could not be separated from the entire arms
package. The proposal still called for the elimination of all SS-20s from Europe, but
did not mention any limits in Asia. This round closed on 13 November 19S6. A
special meeting was held 2-5 December in Geneva in order to advance the negotiations.
The only agreement that was reached was that the talks were at a stalemate.
[Ref. 53: p. 1]
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D. NEGOTIATIONS IN 1987
The seventh round of the INF talks started 17 January 1987 with a new Soviet
chief negotiator. Yuli Voronstsov replaced Victor Karpov, supposedly to give the
stalled negotiations new vigor. New life was breathed into the negotiations on 28
February 1987 when Mikhail Gorbachev reversed his position on linkage between SDI
and INF. He announced that the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe could
be singled out from the package of issues, and that a separate agreement on INF could
be concluded without delay. On 2 March, Voronstsov formally presented an oifer
echoing Gorbachev's February statement, and also suggested that the talks be extended
three weeks. The Soviet offer was not a draft treaty, but was similar to the Reykjavik
proposals without the linkage to SDI. [Ref. 54: p.l]
The U.S. delegation presented a forty page draft treaty on 4 March 19S7. This
proposal included procedures for on-site verification inspections, which the Soviets
accepted in principle. On 12 March, the Americans presented a six point verification
program. The U.S. provisions included:
1. a plan for on-site inspections to monitor facilities that produced, repaired or
stored INF missiles.
2. a plan on whether the missiles would be dismantled, destroyed, or converted
upon removal from Europe.
3. a plan to fix the specific locations of those missiles that each side would be
allowed to retain on their soil.
4. a plan for data transmissions from missile tests would have to be uncoded,
thereby allowing electronic monitoring of the tests by either side.
5. a plan for the exchange of detailed information on the missiles and its
components.
6. a plan to keep the exchanged information current. (Ref. 55: p. 4]
The round closed 26 March without a new Soviet draft treaty being presented. The
Soviets did express some concern over the U.S. position that it reserved the right to
convert Pershing lis to Pershing I-A missiles in order to match the Soviet inventory o[
shorter-range (300-600 miles) in Europe.
During a meeting between George Shultz and Mikhail Gorbachev, in Moscow on
14 April 1987, the Soviet leader proposed a new plan for European missile reduction.
Tass reported on 15 April that Gorbachev offered to eliminate all Soviet shorter-range
missiles from Europe "within a relatively short and clearly defined time frame and also
was prepared to eliminate battlefield tactical weapons". [Ref. 56: p.l|
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General Vladimir Medvedev was named chairman of the Soviet INF negotiating
team, as the eighth round of talks opened on 23 April 19S7, and Alexsei Obukhov was
given oversight duties. These appointments were viewed by the West as an indication
that the Soviets were serious about nailing down an INF treaty. The Soviets presented
a new draft treaty on 27 April. This draft agreed with the basic provisions of the U.S.
4 March draft as it called for the removal of intermediate-range missiles from Europe
and for the prevention of basing any intermediate-range missiles within striking
distance of each others territory. This pro\;>ion would prevent the basing of INF
forces in Alaska, an option favored by the United States. This draft also called for on-
site verification inspections.
The U.S. team was surprised, however, when the Soviets issued a new demand:
that the West German Pershing I-As must be eliminated for an agreement on shorter-
range missiles. This demand was immediately rejected by the U.S. State Department.
Spokesman Charles Redman commented:
The Soviets had not previously raised the question (of West German missiles)
and for them to raise this issue now suggests a lack of serious intent.
[Ref 57: p.l]
The U.S. and Soviet negotiating teams completed the first draft of a treaty, on
medium-range missiles, on 1 June 1987. This combined draft was an attempt to unify
the drafts presented by the two countries. Two points had yet to be resolved:
conversion of Pershing lis into Pershing I-As and the stationing of INT7 missiles in
Alaska.
The U.S. team, on 16 June I9S7, presented a new offer calling for the global
elimination of U.S. and Soviet INF. This global zero option had previously been
proposed by NATO's defense ministers on 15 May. NATO's foreign ministers met in
Reykjavik 1 1-15 June and also endorsed the global zero option.
The INF talks appeared to be deadlocked through July, when Mikhail
Gorbachev announced his acceptance of the global zero option. In an interview with
the Indonesian newspaper, Merdeka, Gorbachev stated:
I can now tell you that in an effort to accommodate the Asian countries and take
into account their concerns, the Soviet Union is prepared to eliminate all of its
medium-range missiles in the Asian part of the country as well, that it is prepared
to remove the question of retaining those 100 warheads on medium-range
missiles which are being discussed with Americans at the negotiations in Geneva,
provided, of course, the United States does the same. Shorter-range missiles will
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also be eliminated. In other words we will proceed from the concept of "global
double zero". We do not link this initiative in this case with the U.S. nuclear
presence in Korea, the Philippines, on Diego Garcia. We would like to hope,
though, that it, at least, will not grow. [Ref. 58: p. 10]
The Soviet negotiation team formally presented the global double zero option
proposal in Geneva on 23 July 1987. The Soviets also used a press conference to
complain that the Pershing I-As are still an obstacle to a treaty. Other obstacles at this
time were: the issue of converting Pershing lis to Pershing I-As. the issue of the
Soviets reducing their arsenal to match the U.S. arsenal prior to any U.S. removal of
weapons, and the issue of equal rights to on-site inspections. The issue of conversion
appeared to be settled on 28 July when the U.S. formally agreed in Geneva, that all
missiles covered by a treaty would not be converted into Pershing I-As but would be
destroyed.
The key stumbling block of the summer session was overcome on 26 August
1987. when West Germany announced it would dismantle the Pershing I-A missiles.
Chancellor Kohl said that if the United States and the Soviet Union implement the
reduction of intermediate-range nuclear forces, West Germany would scrap the
Pershing I-A missiles. This announcement was hailed in both Moscow and
Washington.
The U.S. announced a shift in its verification program on 25 August 1987. The
new plan would limit on-site inspections to known missile facilities in the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. The previous plan had proposed inspections at a broad range of facilities.
The new proposal did include provisions for monitoring by both sides the destruction
of weapons, detailed data exchanges, and initial inspections to verify number of
missiles.
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze arrived in Washington, D.C. on 13 September
1987 for talks with George Shultz. The main barrier to an agreement was the issue of
Pershing I-A missiles in West Germany. The Soviets were not satisfied with
Chancellor Kohl's pledge to dismantle the missiles, and wanted the issue covered by the
treaty. The U.S. opposed including the Pershing I-A issue in the text of the treatv. A
compromise was reached when the U.S. agreed to offer a written assurance to
dismantle the Pershing I-As. This assurance would not be part of the treaty, but would
probably be covered in a separate protocol attached to the treaty. They met from 15-17
September, and late on the 17th of September issued a joint statement declaring that
they agreed in principle to an INF treaty:
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The secretary and the foreign minister reviewed the full spectrum of questions
regarding nuclear, conventional, and chemical weapons arms control. In
particular, the two ministers, together with their advisers, conducted intensive
negotiations on the question of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles.
This resulted in agreement in principle to conclude a treaty, the Geneva
delegations of both sides have been instructed to work intensively to resolve
remaining technical issues and promptly to complete a draft treaty text.
[Ref. 59: p. I]
They also agreed to meet again in Moscow during the second half of October to review
the text of the draft treaty, and to establish dates for a summit between Reagan and
Gorbachev.
Shultz met with Gorbachev on 23 October 1987. Shultz was surprised when
Gorbachev once again linked SDI to an INF treaty. The Soviet leader claimed that a
summit would be possible only if the U.S. agreed to limit SDI testing. Shultz refused
to agree to any ties between SDI and INF and left Moscow with no summit date in
hand. Shultz commented during a press conference from Moscow:
Mr.Gorbachev, as it emerged, is apparently not yet satisfied, particularly in the
area of space and defense, that the state of things is such that he is comfortable
in \isiting Washington, contrary to what was sent out when Mr.Shevardnadze
visited Washington. [Ref. 60: p. 4]
On 30 October 19S7, Shevardnadze met with Ronald Reagan in Washington.
After the meeting, President Reagan announced:
I have just finished meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, and
Mr.Shevardnadze, presented a letter to me from General Secretary Gorbachev:
who has accepted my invitation to come to Washington for a summit on
December 7. At that time we expect to sign an agreement eliminating the entire
class of U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces, or INF. [Ref. 61: p. 5]
The specific details of the proposed INF treaty have not been published, but it is
supposed to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear missiles world wide, both LRINF and
SRINF. This would result in the Soviet Union eliminating 441 SS-20 launchers, 112
SS-4 launchers. 77 SS- 12, 22 launchers, and 375 SS-23 launchers. The United States
would eliminate 10S Pershing lis. and 208 GLCMs. The U.S. would also ensure that
72 West German Pershing I-A missiles would be dismantled. [Ref. 62: p. 22]
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E. SUMMARY
The Soviet position regarding INF shifted repeatedly during the negotiations
from 1985 to 19S7. A summary of their proposals follows:
1. January 1985: Soviets offered to reduce SS-20s in Europe to 162, provided the
U.S. removes ail Pershing lis and GLCMs.
2. November 1 C?S5: Soviets offered to limit SS-20s to 243 in Europe, if U.S.
removes all Pershing-IIs and limits GLCMs to 100 warheads.
3. January 1986: Soviets proposed elimination of all SS- 20s, U.S. Pershing lis
and GLCMs. over a five year period, Soviets also dropped linkage to British
and French forces.
4. February 1986: Soviets dropped linkage of INF to SDL
5. September 1986: Soviets proposed ceiling of 100 warheads for each side in
Europe.
6. October 1986: Soviets offered Reykjavik proposal of zero warheads in Europe.
100 warheads in Asia. Freeze deployment of shorter-range missiles in Europe,
provided U.S. limit SDI research.
7. February 1987: Dropped SDI linkage to INF.
8. April 1987: Soviets proposed zero SRINF in Europe.
9. July 1987: Soviets proposed global zero on both INF and SRINF.
10. October 1987: Soviets linked INF treaty summit to limits on SDI, one week
later reversed position.
An analysis of the Soviet negotiating positions during the negotiations reveals that the
main objective was to remove the threat posed by U.S. Pershing-II and GLCM
nuclear missiles, while maintaining the overall correlation of forces in favor of the
Soviet Union. Another objective was to achieve limitations on. or if possible, the
cancellation of Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative. These two objectives supported
the long time Soviet goal to reduce the military effectiveness of the NATO alliance.
Chapter Five discusses how the proposed INF treaty serves Soviet goals.
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V. IS AN INF TREATY A GOOD DEAL?
A. NATO'S VIEWPOINT
The United States and the Soviet Union signed an INF treaty on 8 December
1987. This treaty directly affects the nuclear force structure in Europe. Moreover, it
directly affects the NATO alliance.
The NATO Nuclear Planning Group positively endorsed the proposed INF
treaty during the recent meeting 3-4 November in Monterey, California. This
endorsement may not truly reflect allied opinion regarding the treaty. On 12 December
1979. NATO declared that if the Soviets removed their SS-20 missiles, NATO would
not deploy Pershing lis and GLCMs. The proposed INF treaty therefore supports the
December 1979 decision. The question remains: does the elimination of the Pershing
lis and GLCMs serve NATO's security interests?
The consensus NATO opinion, after the Reykjavik summit when Reagan almost
concluded an INF deal, was that the INF plan would fulfill a long term Soviet aim:
the effective dismantling of NATO's strategy of flexible response based on the credible
threat of the use of nuclear weapons. NATO'S existing reliance on nuclear weapons
suits West European governments, as the forty year record of nuclear weapons in
deterring Soviet aggression speaks eloquently for its effectiveness.
The deterrence requirement was in fact the main rationale for NATO's December
1979 decision on LRINF modernization and arms control. The decision satisfied
three closely related deterrence needs: to replace obsolescent airborne delivery
systems with reliable modern systems that could penetrate improved Soviet air
defenses; to recouple U.S. nuclear guarantees in the presence of the
intercontinental force ratios negotiated during the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks (SALT) process; and to deploy U.S. land-based systems in Europe of
roughly the same type as the SS-20 missiles the Soviet Union had begun to
deploy in 1977. [Ref. 63: p.4]
To eliminate American medium-range missiles in Europe would lea\e NATO
more vulnerable, a number of the allies contend, to hundreds of Soviet short-range
missiles, to significant Soviet chemical weapons capabilities and to preponderant Soviet
conventional forces. The possibility that American missiles might be removed has once
again left many Europeans worrying about America's commitment to the defense of
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Western Europe. Margaret Thatcher expressed her concern about the removal of
Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles as follows:
It is absolutely vital that we have strict verification arrangements and
negotiations to correct the huge imbalance in the Soviet Union's favour of
shorter range missiles. [Ref. 64: p.4a]
It is unlikely that NATO will compensate for the loss of the Pershing lis and the
GLCMs by increasing conventional forces. The cost in economic resources and the
costs in political capital caused by the build-up of defense budgets make conventional
compensation for lost INF too high. Lord Peter Carrington, Secretary General of
NATO, commented on the costs shortly after the Reykjavik summit:
There is not enough money. ...Conventional forces are much more expensive than
nuclear forces. Men are expensive and the cost of the sophisticated conventional
weapons that we can now develop has increased out of all proportion to
inflation. [Ref. 65: p. 9]
Some Northern European countries are faced with a negative population growth which
also contributes to the dilemma of conventional force maintenance. There are
dwindling supplies of young men to man the armed forces. 6 General Wolfgang
Altenburg commented on the problem:
There are not enough men... Just to maintain the size of the German army would
take even.' male born this year. [Ref. 65: p. 9]
NATO'S European members naturally prefer a big U.S. defense budget to a
bigger defense budget of their own. They also take great comfort in the knowledge
that the United States would use nuclear weapons to defend them. The truth is that
most Western European governments do not want nuclear weapons to be written out
o[ the scenario. U.S. nuclear weapons make low defense budgets a practical
possibility. They do not want to make up the difference in the military balance by
increasing their conventional forces. They would rather depend on the U.S. nuclear
commitment. British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe justifies the nuclear
deterrent policy by arguing: "We don't want to make the world safe for conventional
war". [Ref. 66: p.48]
In 1987 West German recruits are expected to number 225,000, by 1994 it is
expected to fall to only 140,000. Gary Thatcher & G. Molfett III, "Dilemma for
NATO", Christian Science Monitor, 17 April 1987.
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The vocal criticism in NATO of the Reykjavik proposals subsided as it appeared
that an INF deal was inevitable. The fact is that if the two superpowers decide to reach
an agreement, there is little that NATO Europe can do to stop the arms control
process. The reasons for the NATO acquiescence are political:
Their rationales include a judgement that the 1979 two-track decision has been
vindicated, a reluctance to be seen as blocking movement in arms control, a
concern that opposition parties (such as Labour and the SPD) might benefit
from any recalcitrance, and a fear that explicit reservations about the zero option
could undermine their credibility with public opinion and revive anti-nuclear
protest movements. [Ref. 63: pp. 5-6]
The linkage of American nuclear forces to the NATO alliance that was expected
to follow the deployment of the Pershing lis and GLCMs will be removed with this
treaty, although other U.S. nuclear forces will remain.
B. THE UNITED STATES VIEWPOINT
Ronald Reagan entered office in 1981 vowing that his arms control policy would
be vastly different than his predecessor, Jimmy Carter. The Reagan administration's
arms control policy was understood by expert observers to be based on the following
principles:
1. There would be no agreements for the sake of agreement. Any agreement must
be militarily meaningful and must promote stability and U.S. security.
2. In the past, the U.S. has based arms control limitations on the wrong things
such as launchers, what should be limited is warheads.
3. The U.S. will avoid coupling force modernization programs with arms control.
4. Agreements must be based on strict verification which will not be restricted to
NTM (National Technical Means). [Ref. 1: p. 15]
Reagan also campaigned on a platform which declared that the U.S. must
embark on a strategic modernization program. Reagan maintained that the U.S. must
build-up the United States military forces in order to effectively deal with the Soviet
Union. Reagan's position was that the Soviets would have no incentive to deal with an
inferior opponent, and that the U.S. must bargain from a position of strength. These
policies resulted in severe criticism from arms control advocates world wide. The
criticism was that Reagan was not serious about arms control. Public debate on INF
started in Europe in the smaller northern countries of Norway, Denmark, Belgium, and
the Netherlands. Internal opposition against nuclear weapons has grown into a major
political force. What started out as a single issue political left wing campaign against
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the neutron bomb and nuclear weapons has developed into a broadly based movement
with considerable impact. A poll in Britain's Guardian newspaper showed that an
average of 65% of those surveyed in Britain, France, Italy, and West Germany
disapproved of European basing of U.S. missiles. [Ref. 67: p. 35]
The nuclear freeze movement started in 1980 has had significant growth in this
country, similar to the Greens in Europe. Congress has also passed restrictive
legislation on arms control. This ground swell of anti-nuclear opinion increases the
difficulties for the president to meet the requirements of a sound national security
policy. The forthcoming treaty has quelled most of the criticism that Reagan is not
serious about arms control.
Why does Reagan want an INF treaty, especially after the less than enthusiastic
support from NATO on Reagan's proposals at Reykjavik? The Reagan camp is
pleased because the proposed treaty is basically the same plan proposed by Reagan on
18 November 1981. Moreover, by remaining steadfast the U.S. has led the Soviets to
concede on several key issues:
1. The Soviets returned to the bargaining table in 1985, when it was apparent that
the deployment of new INF missiles was not going to be cancelled.
2. The Soviets dropped the demand to include British and French nuclear forces in
the INF negotiations.
3. The Soviets conceded to count warheads vice launchers as the limiting factor in
the negotiations.
-1. The Soviets agreed to accept the global zero limitation on SS-20 missiles.
5. The Soviets dropped the linkage of SDI to an INF agreement.
6. The Soviets have accepted verification by on-site inspections.
The concessions listed above fulfill most of the principles of the Reagan
administration's arms control policy. The most highly debated point is whether the
treaty fulfills the principle of being militarily meaningful and whether it enhances U.S.
securitv.
The strongest criticism of the proposed treaty is that the loss of the deterrent
value of the INF missiles would make NATO vulnerable to massive amounts of Soviet
conventional firepower. General B.W. Rogers voiced his criticism during testimony
before the House Armed Services Committee:
The proposal to eliminate medium range nuclear missiles from Europe would
leave NATO in as bad or worse shape than it was in 1979, when the allies first
decided to deploy the weapons. NATO must, in my opinion, retain nuclear
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weapons if its deterrent is to be credible. The level of risk, to us in Western
Europe would be substantial. [Ref. 68: p. 3]
The security of Western Europe is undermined by the removal of the INF missiles
because the Soviets would be able to compensate for their loss much more easily than
NATO:
The SS-20s and SS-4s threatening Western Europe from the western Soviet
Union would, in principle, be eliminated; but the United States would no longer
retain any missiles on European soil capable of striking the Soviet Union, while
the Soviet Union would retain SRINF missiles and other systems (including sea-
based and intercontinental forces) capable of attacking all the militarily
significant targets in Western Europe from Warsaw Pact territory. Because of the
elimination of a key part ol" the U.S. nuclear presence in Europe, it maybe
argued. Western Europe would become more vulnerable to Soviet intimidation.
[Ref. 63: p.4]
One can argue that the proposed treaty does not threaten the security of the
United States since the weapons involved are located in Europe. However, one must
consider that the U.S. has guaranteed to defend the NATO alliance with nuclear
weapons if necessary. Therefore any treaty that reduces the U.S. inventory of nuclear
weapons affects the credibility o[ the nuclear deterrence guarantee. A strong part of
the rationale behind NATO's 12 December 1979 decision to deploy new INF missiles
was to reassure NATO of the U.S. commitment to defend NATO against possible
attack. Some argue that by removing the missiles as part of the INF treaty, the U.S. is
furthering the Soviet goal to decouple the U.S. from NATO. This idea is debatable.
The tact that the U.S. will still have over 300.000 troops stationed in Europe, if the
missiles are removed, makes a strong statement of America's support for NATO. The
Reagan administration has vociferously denied that the INF treaty reduces the
American commitment to NATO, and also maintains tuat it also does not reduce the
nuclear guarantee. The supporters of the proposed treaty point out that even with the
removal of the Pershing II and GLCMs, the U.S. will still have over 4,000 nuclear
warheads for theater use in Europe, so the nuclear commitment will still be there.
However, if these systems are sufficient, why was the decision ever made to deploy new
weapons? Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor criticized the treaty:
Their (INF) removal thus cannot but have a psychologically uncoupling effect
completely contrary to the original purpose for their emplacement to reassure our
allies. I he administration erred in the first place by proposing the zero option in
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1981; that decision should not now be used as justification for withdrawal of the
weapons. The fundamental political purpose for the INF deployment remains.
[Ref. 69: p. 15]
The INF treaty will return NATO to where it was in INF force structure in 1979,
but will not return the Soviet Union to its 1979 force structure. The treaty will
presumably remove the SS-20s that were the prime concern of NATO in 1979, but it
does not remove the other Soviet modernization efforts. The treaty does nothing
about the improved air defenses developed by the Soviets which put at risk the ability
of U.S. forward based systems to effectively strike the Soviet Union.
When comparing numbers, it appears that the Soviets are giving up more than
the United States. However, by removing these missiles from Europe, the President
limits the military options available to NATO. The void caused by the removal of the
Pershing II and GLCMs could be filled by SLCM's. However, a SLCM fired from a
U.S. battleship, off the coast of France, would probably be perceived, by the Soviets,
as the same thing as an ICBM launched from Kansas, while it is not clear whether they
would regard the firing of a Pershing II from West Germany in the same light. Despite
the Soviet declaratory policy, it is a possibility that they would be reluctant to take the
war to the shores of the U.S. because of a launch of a Pershing II in West Germany.
The removal of these missiles will lessen the military options of both the United
States and the Soviet Union. The proposed treaty would require the Soviets to
eliminate 1565 warheads, while the U.S. NATO would be required to eliminate 388
warheads (all the GLCMs have not yet been deployed) (see Appendix B). The Soviets
are giving up much more than the United States; therefore, the treaty constitutes a
major victory for Ronald Reagan!
C. THE SOVIET VIEWPOINT
Why would Gorbachev agree to a deal which includes such a large disparity in
Soviet to U.S. reductions and why would Gorbachev concede on restrictions on SDI?
The Soviet goals in the INF negotiations were to weaken the NATO alliance militarily
and politically. The military objective was to achieve a force structure which supports
Soviet military doctrine.
Throughout the history of the Soviet Union, the survival of the state has been a
primary goal. Nuclear forces stationed in Europe which can target Soviet territory are
a prime threat to the safety of the state. As mentioned previously U.S. forward based
nuclear svstems have been a Soviet concern since the 1950s and have been an issue as
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far back as SALT I. An agreement that removes Pershing II and Ground Launched
Cruise Missiles therefore removes a threat to the Soviet state.
The range, mobility, and most importantly the short flight time of a Pershing II
enroute to targets in the Soviet homeland, caused great concern in the Soviet Union.
The Soviets believed that Pershing lis deployed in West Germany could reach targets
in Moscow. They also claimed that it was a first strike weapon, capable of surprise
attack, with a range of 2500km. The Soviets feared the Pershing II more than the
GLCMs. This was evident by their proposal in September 1986 to restrict NATO to
100 GLCM warheads providing NATO removed all the Pershing lis.
The INF treaty not only removes a threat from the Soviet homeland, but also
directly supports Soviet military doctrine. As discussed in Chapter Two, in the event
of war, the Soviets would prefer to fight a conventional war rather than a nuclear war.
The proposed treaty supports this in several ways. The deployment of INF missiles
complicated Soviet targeting by tripling the number of time urgent targets. The
removal of NATO's INF missiles reduces the critical target list from a potential 857 to
285. The Soviets have sufficient assets to cover these important targets. The
proposed treaty not only reduces the target list but also reduces NATO's ability to
earn- out nuclear strikes against the Soviet homeland. The reductions also reduce the
alliance's ability to carry out theater nuclear war, therefore lessening the likelihood of a
conventional conflict escalating into nuclear war.
From 1979 to 1987, the Soviet Union conducted a massive modernization of their
theater nuclear forces (see Appendix-A and Appendix-B). They increased their short
range forces by 62% and have over 9,000 warheads available for theater use. The
reduction ol~ 1,887 warheads is less than a 21% reduction in Soviet force levels. While
it is rare for the Soviets to give up anything, a 21% reduction is a small price to pay,
especially considering the conventional force balance between NATO and the Soviet
Union. The short-range missile systems developed by the Soviets in the late 1970s are
not only nuclear but can be used in a conventional mode. This dual capability
increases the Soviet's ability to use these systems in a preemptive first strike against
The Soviets claim a range of 2500km for the Pershing II vice the U.S. range
estimate of 1800km. This is significant because at 1800km the Pershing II can not in
fact reach Moscow from its deployment points in West Germany, but it could with a
range of 2500km. Whence the Threat to Peace, 3rd edition, Military Publishing House,
VIoscow,19S4, p. 66.
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NATO nuclear forces. Since the INF treaty covers only nuclear forces, these dual
systems become much more important.
In sum, the Soviet Union is investing heavily in a new generation of short-range
ballistic missiles based in Eastern Europe to participate fully in conventional
preemption. To the extent that this force can contribute to the preemption goal,
Soviet Planning confidence in executing the conventional-only contingency will
grow. In fact, emerging missile improvements represent only the latest addition
to the current cycle in the Soviet force development process. While frontal
aviation's new weapon systems and technologies motivated the development of
improved forms and methods of combat operations (conventional preemption by
the air operation), highly accurate short-range missiles are influencing the
perfection of these operational concepts. [Ref. 70: p. 99]
Albert Wohlstetter criticized the proposed Soviet reductions as being insignificant due
to their overall force structure:
The current eifect to abolish intermediate-range ballistic missiles sulTer from the
"punched pillow effect", because the Soviets can simply compensate for their loss
by bulging their nuclear arsenal in other areas, such as extending the range of
shorter-range missiles. [Ref. 71: p. 56]
It is still too early to tell whether Gorbachev has really conceded to Reagan's
desire not to link SDI to the INF treaty, especially since Gorbachev has linked
restrictions on SDI to INF, whenever he felt that Reagan might be a little too eager to
conclude a treaty before he leaves office. Gorbachev has not given up on limiting SDI;
he has only shifted it from INF to the START negotiations. After all, limiting space
weapons has been a major part of Soviet diplomatic propaganda for over three years.
SDI was the major obstacle preventing an agreement at Reykjavik, and delinking
it from the INF treaty appears to be a large concession to Ronald Reagan. The
linking of SDI to an arms control agreement in Iceland achieved several Soviet goals:
1. It gave the world the impression that the U.S. was attempting to destroy the
ABM treaty by pursuing the SDI program.
2. It attempted to show that Reagan, and not Gorbachev was holding up arms
control negotiations by Reagan's unyielding position on SDI.
It appears that this was successful, especially in Europe, where a recent poll indicated
that Europeans believed that Gorbachev was working harder than Reagan to achieve
world peace. Congress' recent cut of the SDI budget may have been influenced by the
Soviet propaganda campaign. It certainly allowed Gorbachev to back off the SDI issue
thereby appearing more sincere and conciliatory in desiring the achievement of an arms
control deal.
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Many Western Sovietologists believe that Gorbachev needs an arms control deal
to enable him to proceed with his economic programs. There has been a long standing
study by U.S. intelligence agencies to determine the scope of Soviet defense spending
in comparison to the growth of the Soviet economy. Estimates range from 8% to 20%
of Soviet GNP goes to defense, depending on the source of the study. While the actual
numbers \ary. most intelligence experts believe that the Soviet economy is stagnating
and that economic reform is necessary.
In the latest Soviet Five Year Plan 1986-1990, Gorbachev has stated his desires
to dynamize the Soviet economy. His goals are to increase investment in the consumer
sector by 50% (compared with 32% in the previous plan), and increase retail trade
turnover by 33% (compared with 16% in the previous plan). It is unlikely that he will
be unable to reach these goals if 20% of Soviet GNP continues to go towards defense.
Therefore the military complex must yield to the consumer sector. [Ref. 72: p. 26]
Since the SS-20 is a modular missile, support parts from SS-20s could be used to
make SS-25s. The proposed treaty supposedly would prevent this type of conversion.
However, it probably will not prevent the Soviets from doing some type of component
switching. It is highly un-Soviet to throw any thing away!
D. CONCLUSION
Despite the apparent Soviet concessions to Reagan in the INF negotiations, the
signing of the treaty would be a victory for Gorbachev. The treaty may accomplish
both the military and political goals of the Soviet Union. The military goal of
removing the threat of Pershing lis and GLCMs would be achieved. The political goal
of weakening the NATO alliance by decoupling the U.S. from its allies may also be
furthered by the treaty.
The removal of NATO's INF missiles reduces the ability of NATO to exercise
the nuclear option of flexible response. NATO's nuclear guarantee may be suspect due
to the size of the arsenal of Soviet nuclear strategic weapons. A key decision to deploy
new INF missiles was to visibly link the U.S. commitment to NATO's defense. The
most important reason for the INF deployment was their deterrent value. This
deterrent value will be lost with the INF deal.
The signing of an INF treaty also enhances the reputation of Gorbachev as a
peacemaker. Gorbachev's manipulation of Western media has helped reestablish
detente between the Soviet Union and the West. Through detente, the Soviet Union
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will continue to get needed technology to further expand the Soviet economy.
President Reagan has been called "the great communicator". However, many
Europeans feel that Gorbachev is more sincere than Reagan in regards to arms control
and disarmament. The INF negotiations have only increased this image of Gorbachev.
One can argue that the INF treaty is a mistake because it removes Pershings lis
and GLCMs which are a strong deterrent to the Soviets. However, one must
remember that there are still over 4.000 nuclear warheads in Europe linking the
American nuclear guarantee to NATO. Also, it is this author's opinion that the
strongest deterrent to the Soviets is not nuclear weapons but the 300,000 American
troops stationed in Europe. As long as these troops are deployed to Europe, the U.S.
will be visibly linked to NATO. The treaty does remove the forces that NATO
considered important, in 1979, for U.S. NATO linkage. However, it is not necessarily
an indication that the U.S. desires to delink itself from the alliance.
This treaty, if implimented, would be the first arms control treaty that actually
reduces arms. This makes the treaty a significant achievement for the Reagan
administration. However, one can argue that the treaty is also a significant
accomplishment for the Soviet Union. Only time will tell if the air of detente created
bv this treatv, furthers world stability or furthers the march of communism!
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APPENDIX A
INF NUCLEAR BALANCE 1979
SOVIET UNION - WARSAW PACT
IRBM MRBM ^Deployed First Deployed RANGE(Mi) WARHEADS
SS-4 500 1959 1.200 500
SS-5 90 1961 2,300 90
SS-20 100 1977 4,000 300
SRBM
SS-1B 440 1965 50 440
FROG-7 4 T4 1965 45 474
SS-1C 554 1965 185 554
SS-12 100 1969 500 100




HONEST JOHN 54 1953 25 54
PERSHING 1-A ISO 1962 450 180
LANCE 98 1972 70 98
(figures compiled from The Military Balance 197S-1979)
International Institute For Strategic Studies, London, 1979
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APPENDIX B
INF NUCLEAR BALANCE 1987
SOVIET UNION - WARSAW PACT
IRBM.MRBM ^Deployed First Deployed RANGE(Mi) WARHEADS
SS-4 112 1^59 1,200 112
SS-5 1901 2,300
SS-20 441 1977 4,000 1323
SRBM
SS-1B C 143 1965 50 143
FROG-7 214 1965 45 214
SS-12 22 77 1969 500 77
SS-21 350 1978 65 350




Pershing II 108 1983 1125 108
GLCM 208 1983 1400 208
PERSHING I-A 72 1962 450 72
LANCE 108 1972 70 108
(figures compiled from The Military Balance 1986-1987)
International Institute For Strategic Studies, London, 1987
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